Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/34

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry the Council concluded, on or before 17 March 2003, that Iraq had demonstrated full, unconditional, immediate and active co‑operation in accordance with its disarmament obligations and was yielding possession of all weapons and proscribed material to UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

210. President Putin told Mr Blair on 7 March that Russia would oppose military action.

211. Mr Straw told Mr Annan that military considerations could not be allowed “to dictate policy”, but the military build‑up “could not be maintained for ever”, and:

212. Mr Straw set out the UK thinking on a deadline, stating that this was “Iraq’s last chance”, but the objective was disarmament and, if Saddam Hussein did what was demanded, “he could stay”. In those circumstances, a “permanent and toughened inspections regime” would be needed, possibly “picking up some earlier ideas for an all‑Iraq NFZ”.

213. Lord Goldsmith sent his formal advice to Mr Blair on 7 March.

214. When Mr Blair spoke to President Bush at 6pm on 7 March he emphasised the importance of securing nine positive votes in the Security Council for Parliamentary approval for UK military action.

215. Mr Blair argued that while the 17 March deadline in the draft resolution was not sufficient for Iraq to disarm fully, it was sufficient to make a judgement on whether Saddam Hussein had had a change of heart. If Iraq started to co‑operate, the inspectors could have as much time as they liked.

216. In a last attempt to move opinion and secure the support of nine members of the Security Council, Mr Blair decided on 8 March to propose a short extension of the timetable beyond 17 March and to revive the idea of producing a “side statement” setting out a series of tests which would provide the basis for a judgement on Saddam Hussein’s intentions. Rh