Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/28

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

162. In their reports to the Security Council on 14 February:

163. In the subsequent debate, members of the Security Council voiced widely divergent views.

164. Mr Annan concluded that there were real differences on strategy and timing in the Security Council. Iraq's non‑co‑operation was insufficient to bring members to agree that war was justified; they would only move if they came to their own judgement that inspections were pointless.

165. On 19 February, Mr Blair sent President Bush a six‑page Note. He proposed focusing on the absence of full co‑operation and a "simple" resolution stating that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity, with a side statement defining tough tests of co‑operation and a vote on 14 March to provide a deadline for action.

166. President Bush and Mr Blair agreed to introduce a draft resolution at the UN the following week but its terms were subject to further discussion.

167. On 20 February, Mr Blair told Dr Blix that he wanted to offer the US an alternative strategy which included a deadline and tests for compliance. He did not think Saddam Hussein would co‑operate but he would try to get Dr Blix as much time as possible. Iraq could have signalled a change of heart in the December declaration. The Americans did not think that Saddam was going to co‑operate: "Nor did he. But we needed to keep the international community together."

168. Dr Blix stated that full co‑operation was a nebulous concept; and a deadline of 15 April would be too early. Dr Blix commented that "perhaps there was not much WMD in Iraq after all". Mr Blair responded that "even German and French intelligence were sure that there was WMD in Iraq". Dr Blix said they seemed "unsure" about "mobile BW Rh