Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/27

Rh clear statement" from Dr Blix which allowed the US and UK to argue that a failure to pass a second resolution was in breach of the spirit of 1441, remained in his view, overwhelming; and that inspectors should be given until the end of March or early April to carry out their task.

152. Mr Blair suggested that, in the absence of a "smoking gun", Dr Blix would be able to harden up his findings on the basis of a pattern of non‑co‑operation from Iraq and that that would be sufficient for support for military action in the Security Council.

153. The US and UK should seek to persuade others, including Dr Blix, that that was the "true view" of resolution 1441.

154. Mr Blair used an interview on Breakfast with Frost on 26 January to set out the position that the inspections should be given sufficient time to determine whether or not Saddam Hussein was co‑operating fully. If he was not, that would be a sufficient reason for military action. A find of WMD was not required.

155. Mr Blair's proposed approach to his meeting with President Bush was discussed in a meeting of Ministers before Cabinet on 30 January and then discussed in general terms in Cabinet itself.

156. In a Note prepared before his meeting with President Bush on 31 January, Mr Blair proposed seeking a UN resolution on 5 March followed by an attempt to "mobilise Arab opinion to try to force Saddam out" before military action on 15 March.

157. When Mr Blair met President Bush on 31 January, it was clear that the window of opportunity before the US took military action would be very short. The military campaign could begin "around 10 March".

158. President Bush agreed to seek a second resolution to help Mr Blair, but there were major reservations within the US Administration about the wisdom of that approach.

159. Mr Blair confirmed that he was "solidly with the President and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam" Hussein.

160. Reporting on his visit to Washington, Mr Blair told Parliament on 3 February 2003 that Saddam Hussein was not co‑operating as required by resolution 1441 and, if that continued, a second resolution should be passed to confirm such a material breach.

161. Mr Blair continued to set the need for action against Iraq in the context of the need to be seen to enforce the will of the UN and to deter future threats. Rh