Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/26

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 143. In early 2003, Mr Straw still thought a peaceful solution was more likely than military action. Mr Straw advised Mr Blair on 3 January that he had concluded that, in the potential absence of a "smoking gun", there was a need to consider a "Plan B". The UK should emphasise to the US that the preferred strategy was peaceful disarmament.

144.  Mr Blair took a different view. By the time he returned to the office on 4 January 2003, he had concluded that the "likelihood was war" and, if conflict could not be avoided, the right thing to do was fully to support the US. He was focused on the need to establish evidence of an Iraqi breach, to persuade opinion of the case for action and to finalise the strategy with President Bush at the end of January.

145.  The UK objectives were published in a Written Ministerial Statement by Mr Straw on 7 January. The "prime objective" was:

146.  Lord Goldsmith gave Mr Blair his draft advice on 14 January that resolution 1441 would not by itself authorise the use of military force.

147.  Mr Blair agreed on 17 January to deploy a UK division with three combat brigades for possible operations in southern Iraq.

148.  There was no collective discussion of the decision by senior Ministers.

149.  In January 2003, there was a clear divergence between the UK and US Government positions over the timetable for military action, and the UK became increasingly concerned that US impatience with the inspections process would lead to a decision to take unilateral military action in the absence of support for such action in the Security Council.

150.  On 23 January, Mr Blair was advised that the US military would be ready for action in mid‑February.

151.  In a Note to President Bush on 24 January, Mr Blair wrote that the arguments for proceeding with a second Security Council resolution, "or at the very least a Rh