Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/144

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry answer to the question of where the primary responsibility for identifying capability gaps lay during Op TELIC. That is unacceptable. The roles and responsibilities for identifying and articulating capability gaps in enduring operations must be clearly defined, communicated and understood by those concerned. It is possible that this has been addressed after the period covered by this Inquiry.

899.  Those responsible for making decisions on the investment in military capabilities should continually evaluate whether the balance between current operational requirements and long‑term defence programmes is right, particularly to meet an evolving threat on current operations.

900.  During the first four years of Op TELIC, there was no clear statement of policy setting out the acceptable level of risk to UK forces and who was responsible for managing that risk. The MOD has suggested to the Inquiry that successive policies defining risk ownership and governance more clearly have addressed that absence, and that wider MOD risk management processes have also been revised. In any future operation the level of force protection required to meet the assessed threat needs to be addressed explicitly.

Civilian personnel

901.  The Inquiry recognises that, since 2003, significant changes have been made to the UK’s strategic and operational approach to reconstruction and stabilisation. Some of those changes, including the establishment of a deployable UK civilian stand‑by capability, are the direct result of lessons learned from serious shortcomings in the deployment of civilian personnel in post‑conflict Iraq.

902.  The effectiveness of the UK civilian effort in post‑conflict Iraq was compromised by a range of factors, including the absence of effective cross‑government co‑ordination on risk, duty of care and the terms and conditions applicable to personnel serving in Iraq.

903.  The difficult working conditions for civilians in Iraq were reflected in short tour lengths and frequent leave breaks. Different departments adopted different arrangements throughout the Iraq campaign, leading to concerns about breaks in continuity, loss of momentum, lack of institutional memory and insufficient local knowledge.

904.  Different departments will continue to deploy civilian staff in different roles. Standardisation of all aspects of those deployments may not be appropriate, but greater harmonisation of departmental policies should be considered wherever possible. The same approach should be applied to locally engaged (LE) staff.

905.  At all stages, including planning, departments must give full consideration to their responsibilities and duty of care towards LE staff, who have an essential contribution to make and will face particular risks in insecure environments. 140