Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/13

Rh * "Iranian interdiction efforts" had "significantly reduced smuggling down the Gulf", but Saddam Hussein had "compensated by exploiting land routes to Turkey and Syria".
 * "Most countries" believed that economic sanctions were "ineffective, counterproductive and should now be lifted. Without active enforcement, the economic sanctions regime" would "continue to erode".

41. The Assessment also stated:


 * Saddam Hussein needed funds "to maintain his military and security apparatus and secure its loyalty".
 * Despite the availability of funds, Iraq had been slow to comply with UN recommendations on food allocation. Saddam needed "the Iraqi people to suffer to underpin his campaign against sanctions".
 * Encouraged by the success of Iraq's border trade agreement with Turkey, "front‑line states" were "not enforcing sanctions'".
 * There had been a "significant increase in the erosion of sanctions over the past six months".

42. When Mr Blair had his first meeting with President Bush at Camp David in late February 2001, the US and UK agreed on the need for a policy which was more widely supported in the Middle East region. Mr Blair had concluded that public presentation needed to be improved. He suggested that the approach should be presented as a "deal" comprising four elements:


 * do the right thing by the Iraqi people, with whom we have no quarrel;
 * tighten weapons controls on Saddam Hussein;
 * retain financial control on Saddam Hussein; and
 * retain our ability to strike.

43. The stated position of the UK Government in February 2001 was that containment had been broadly successful.

44.  During the summer of 2001, the UK had been exploring the way forward with the US, Russia and France on a draft Security Council resolution to put in place a "smart sanctions" regime. But there was no agreement on the way ahead between the UK, the US, China, France and Russia, the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.

Rh