Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/11

Rh the longer term, to reintegrate a territorially intact Iraq as a law‑abiding member of the international community."

28. The policy of containment was seen as the "only viable way" to pursue those objectives. A "policy of trying to topple Saddam would command no useful international support". Iraq was unlikely to accept the package immediately but "might be persuaded to acquiesce eventually".

29.  After prolonged discussion about the way ahead, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1284 in December 1999, although China, France and Russia abstained.

30. The resolution established:


 * a new inspectorate, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) (which Dr Hans Blix was subsequently appointed to lead);
 * a timetable to identify and agree a work programme; and
 * the principle that, if the inspectors reported co‑operation in key areas, that would lead to the suspension of economic sanctions.

31. Resolution 1284 described Iraq's obligations to comply with the disarmament standards of resolution 687 and other related resolutions as the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance"; and provided that the Security Council would decide what was required of Iraq for the implementation of each task and that it should be "clearly defined and precise".

32. The resolution was also a deliberate compromise which changed the criterion for the suspension, and eventual lifting, of sanctions from complete disarmament to tests which would be based on judgements by UNMOVIC on the progress made in completing identified tasks.

33. Iraq refused to accept the provisions of resolution 1284, including the re‑admission of weapons inspectors. Concerns about Iraq's activities in the absence of inspectors increased.

34. The US Presidential election in November 2000 prompted a further UK review of the operation of the containment policy (see Section 1.2). There were concerns about how long the policy could be sustained and what it could achieve.

35. There were also concerns over both the continued legal basis for operations in the No‑Fly Zones (NFZs) and the conduct of individual operations. Rh