Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/108

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry A POSSIBLE CIVIL WAR

752.  By March 2006, senior members of the UK military were considering the possibility of civil war in Iraq, prompted by rising levels of sectarian violence and concerns that the Iraqi Government was “not ... perceived as even‑handed in security issues”. The risk of civil war had been acknowledged by Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja’afari in the wake of the bombing of the al‑Askari mosque in February. Although there was general agreement that the situation in Iraq did not constitute civil war, the risk that one might develop was considered to be real.

753.  At this time, the presence in Iraq of the MNF was authorised by resolution 1637 (2005). The exchange of letters between Prime Minister Ja’afari and the President of the Security Council which accompanied the resolution clearly identified providing security for the Iraqi people as the reason why a continued MNF presence was necessary.

754.  In late April, FCO officials were concerned that security in Basra was declining and that a determined and sustained effort, including a more assertive military posture, would be required to deliver the UK’s objective of transferring Basra to Iraqi control by late 2006 or early 2007.

755.  Accounts from mid‑2006 suggested that security in MND(SE) was a significant concern, characterised by “steady, if generally unspectacular, decline” and increased militia activity. The UK military’s approach had generated US concern and the security situation was limiting UK civilian activity.

756.  Gen Jackson’s assessment in May of the short‑term security prospects in Iraq was bleak. He judged that “what we will leave behind will not look much like strategic success. Ten years hence our strategy may fully bear fruit.”

757.  After visiting Iraq in early May, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Chief of the Defence Staff, advised Dr Reid that there should be no change to the operational approach and that there were “compelling reasons” why the UK should “press on” with handing over security to Iraq, including to permit the UK’s continuing build‑up in Afghanistan. ACM Stirrup identified the risk that UK withdrawal from Basra would be seen as a “strategic failure” and suggested that “astute conditioning of the UK public may be necessary” to avoid that.

758.  ACM Stirrup’s view that the UK should press ahead with drawdown despite the security challenges in Basra was not consistent with Government policy that withdrawal should be conditions‑based. Rh