Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/100

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 698.  Despite mounting evidence of violent insurgency, the UK’s policy of military drawdown in Iraq continued. After force levels had been reviewed in January, the rationale for continued drawdown was based on adjusted criteria by which the success of Security Sector Reform would be judged, meaning that such reform would be implemented “only to applicable standards for Iraq”.

THE TURNING POINT

699.  February 2004 was the worst month for Coalition casualties since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. More than 200 people, mainly Iraqi citizens, were killed in suicide attacks. Attacks on the Iraqi Security Forces were increasing and concerns about Islamic extremists operating in Iraq began to grow. By the end of March, more than 200 attacks targeting Iraqi citizens were being reported each week.

700.  In April, there was a sudden escalation in attacks by the Jaysh al‑Mahdi (JAM) in Basra, described by the General Officer Commanding MND(SE) as “like a switch had been flicked”. In Fallujah, a US offensive which followed the ambush and murder of four security contractors provoked an angry response from the Sunni community.

701.  The significant worsening of security, coupled with revelations of abuse by members of the US military of Iraqi detainees held in Abu Ghraib prison, led many of the Inquiry’s witnesses to conclude that the spring of 2004 had been a turning point.

702.  At the end of April, Mr Blair’s analysis was that the key issue in Iraq was not multi‑faceted, rather it was “simple: security”.

703.  Despite the failing security situation in MND(SE) in spring 2004, Gen Walker was explicit that no additional troops were required for the tasks currently assigned to the UK.

704.  The Chiefs of Staff maintained the view they had originally reached in November 2003, that HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) should not be actively considered for deployment to Iraq, even though: Rh