Page:The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz (Volume Three).djvu/426

 Klux policy, compelled him to choose a course of action different from that of his dear friend Sumner. Practically all the other Republican Senators of the anti-administration group agreed with Schurz. Prestige had usually given to Sumner the nominal leadership of this group. Now, so far as there was any leadership, it fell to Schurz.

At the end of March, 1871, the Santo Domingo affair made its last appearance in formal debate. Sumner had introduced a series of resolutions censuring the use made of the navy in connection with Babcock's visits and with later proceedings under the preliminary protocol. This touched the weakest spot in the presidential case; for with cheerful disregard of all the nice points of diplomatic and international practice, Grant, Secretary Robeson, Babcock and sundry naval commanders had practically taken armed possession of Santo Domingo and committed acts of war against Hayti with no right whatever, but merely in anticipation of the ratification of the treaty. Schurz's speech on these resolutions was an extremely effective demonstration in public law. Morton, presuming, as he often did in colloquy with Schurz, that the latter's foreign nativity implied a lack of familiarity with our history, sought to trip him up by reference to the opening of the Mexican War, but spoke incautiously and without due preparation. Schurz easily, completely and ludicrously discomfited him. Sumner's resolutions failed, of course, to pass, but their chief purpose was attained in drawing public attention to some very reckless acts of the administration.

On the Ku Klux question, which was the chief subject of debate in the spring of 1871, a determined purpose was manifested by the radical leaders, when once they had secured the support of the President for their policy, to make it the supreme test of party fealty and to use it for effecting the