Page:The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz (Volume One).djvu/228

 ought to have recognized from the start that the utmost exertion of their strength could not possibly be sufficient to resist the united power of the German princes, or even that of Prussia alone. There was no hope of success unless the popular uprising spread beyond its present boundaries into the rest of Germany. To this end all the available forces that could be mustered should without delay have been thrown across the frontiers in order to draw into the revolutionary movement the population of the neighboring states; in the first place those of Würtemberg and Hessen. A young officer of Baden, Franz Sigel, who had been promoted to major by the provisional government, recognized this clearly enough, and he counseled an advance into Würtemberg. The provisional government permitted him to lead an expedition into the grand duchy of Hessen with a small force, but after an unfortunate engagement he was ordered back. The provisional governments of Baden and of the Palatinate could not screw up their courage to an offensive venture across their boundaries; they did not see that their defeat was inevitable if they waited in a defensive attitude for the attacks of the hostile forces. They continued to cling to the desperate hope that the Prussian government after all at the last moment would recoil from an active assault upon the defenders of the national constitution; or, if not, that the Prussian “Landwehr” would refuse to fight against their brothers who had risen for a common cause. Whatever the Landwehr might have done if the revolutionary army, with bold resolution and victorious courage, had come to meet them on their own ground, and had so appealed to their sympathies, it could hardly be expected of them that they would sacrifice themselves for a cause which was only timidly defended by its champions. But however clear this should have been at the time to the leaders in Baden and the