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34 continues. Often it seems to us that the struggle must be endless. At all events we must here look at some of its phases.

In the days of the Sophists, Greek thought had reached its first great era of ethical skepticism. This skepticism was directed against the ideals of popular morality. “They are not self-evident and necessary ideals,” said in substance the Sophists. “They are conventions. They are private judgments.” The popular ideals were of course popularly defended against such assaults by the use of the national religion. “The gods made these distinctions,” it is replied. “The gods are able to enforce them; therefore, fear the gods.”

Skepticism had two answers to this defense. The one answer was simple: “Who knows whether there are any gods, or what the gods, if they exist, may choose to do?” The other answer was more subtle, because it really expressed in skeptical guise a new form of moral idealism. It is best preserved to us in a fine passage in the second book of Plato’s Republic. Here the young men, Glaucon and Adeimantos, confess that certain sophistic objections to the reality of moral distinctions are deeply puzzling to themselves. They ask Socrates to discuss the matter in some such fashion as to remove these doubts. They sum up the doubts in substance as follows: Grant that the gods are of irresistible might, and that they are disposed to enforce some moral law;