Page:The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 Volume 3.djvu/321

 variety of principles developed, I thought that on which it is established the least exceptionable, and it appears to me sufficiently well guarded. …

(The 7th section read.)

Mr. Grayson objected to the power of the senate to propose or concur with amendments to money bills. He looked upon the power of proposing amendments to be equal in principle to that of originating, and that they were in fact the same. As this was, in his opinion, a departure from that great principle which required that the immediate representatives of the people only should interfere with money bills; he wished to know the reasons on which it was founded. The lords in England had never been allowed to intermeddle with money bills. He knew not why the senate should. In the lower house, said he, the people are represented according to their numbers. In the upper house, the states are represented in their political capacities. Delaware or Rhode-Island has as many representatives here as Massachusetts. Why should the senate have a right to intermeddle with money, when the representation is neither equal or just?

Mr. Madison.—Mr. Chairman—The criticism made by the honorable member, is, that there is an ambiguity in the words, and that it is not clearly ascertained where the origination of money bills may take place. I suppose the first part of the clause is sufficiently expressed to exclude all doubts. The gentlemen who composed the convention divided in opinion, concerning the utility of confining this to any particular branch. Whatever it be in Great-Britain, there is a sufficient difference between us and them to render it inapplicable to this country. It always appeared to me to be a matter of no great consequence, whether the senate had a right of originating, or proposing amendments to money bills or not. To withhold it from them would create disagreeable disputes. Some American constitutions make no difference. Virginia and South-Carolina, are, I think, the only states where this power is restrained. In Massachusetts, and other states, the power of proposing amendments is vested unquestionably in their senates. No inconvenience has resulted from it. On the contrary, with respect to South-Carolina, this clause is continually a source of disputes. When a bill comes from the other house, the senate entirely rejects it, and this causes contentions. When you send a bill to the senate, without the power of making any alteration you force them to reject the bill altogether, when it would be necessary and advantageous that it should pass. The power of proposing alterations removes this inconvenience, and does not appear to me at all objectionable. I