Page:The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 Volume 2.djvu/506

 500 RECORD8 OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION Tuesday MADISON September 4 Mr. Madison was apprehensive that by requiring both the President & vice President to be chosen out of the five high- est candidates, the attention of the electors would be turned too much to making candidates instead of giving their votes in order to a definitive choice, Should this turn be given to the business, the election would in fact be consigned to the Senate altogether. It would have the effect at the same time, he observed, of giving the nomination of the candidates to the largest States. Mr Govr Morris concurred in, & enforced the remarks of Mr. Madison. Mr Randolph & Mr Pinkney wished for a particular expla- nation & discussion of the reasons for changing the mode of electing the Executive. Mr. Govr. Morris said he would give the reasons of the Committee and his own. The Ist. was the danger of intrigue & faction if the appointmt. should be made by the Legis- lature.  the inconvenleic� of an ineligibility required by that mode in order to lessen its evils. 3 The difficulty of establishing a Court of Impeachments, other than the Senate which would not be so proper for the trial nor the other branch for the impeachment of the President, if appointed by the Legislature, 4- No body had appeared to be satisfied with an appointment by the Legislature. 5. Many were anxious even for an immediate choice by the people-- 6-- the in- dispensable necessity of making the Executive independent of the Legislature.- As the Electors would vote at the same time throughout the U.S. and at so great a distance from each other, the great evil of cabal was avoided. It would be im- possible also to corrupt them. A conclusive reason for mak- ing the Senate instead of the Supreme Court the Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the President after the trial of the impeachment. Col: Mason confessed that the plan of the Committee had removed some capital objections, particularly the danger of cabal and corruption. It was liable however to this strong objection, that nineteen times in twenty the President would be chosen by the Senate, an improper body for the purpose.

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