Page:The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 Volume 2.djvu/104

 I00 lECO1LD$ OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION Tuesday MADISON Mr. Gerry opposed it. He thought there was no ground to apprehend the danger urged by Mr. Houston. The election of the Executive Magistrate will be considered as of vast importance and will create great earnestness. The best men, the Governours of the States will not hold it derogatory from their character to be the electors. If the motion should be agreed to, it will be necessary to make the Executive ineli- gible a 2d. time, in order to render him independent of the Legislature; which was an idea extremely repugnant to his way of thinking. Mr. Strong supposed that there would be no necessit� if the Executive should be appointed by the Legislature, to make him ineligible a 2d. time; as new elections of the Legislature will have intervened; and he will not depend for his zd. appointment on the same sett of men as his first was recd. from. It had been suggested that gratitude for his past appoint- ment wd. produce the same effect as dependence for his future appointment. He thought very differently. Besides this objection would lie agst. the Electors who would be objects of gratitude as well as the Legislature. It was of great impor- tance not to make the Govt. too complex which would be the case if a new sett of men like the Electors should be intro- duced into it. He thought also that the first characters in the States would not feel sufficient motives to undertake the office of Electors. Mr. Williamson was for going back to the original ground; to elect the Executive for 7 years and render him ineligible a zd. time. The proposed Electors would certainly not be men of the Ist. nor even of the 2d. grade in the States. These would all prefer a seat either in the Senate or the other branch of the Legislature. He did not like the Unity in the Execu- tive. He had wished the Executive power to be lodged in three men taken from three districts into which the States should be divided. As the Executive is to have a kind of veto on the laws, and there is an essential difference of inter- ests between the N. & S. States, particularly in the carrying trade, the power will be dangerous, if the Executive is to be taken from part of the Union, to the part from which he is

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