Page:The Proletarian Revolution in Russia - Lenin, Trotsky and Chicherin - ed. Louis C. Fraina (1918).djvu/438

 together with the uncertainty of where the German troops would stop, was an extremely dangerous one. The indistinct, contradictory, and somewhat impracticable stipulations concerning the Russian ships create the possibility for new demands from Germany and the Ukraine upon Russia. Besides there was the possibility of going still further than the stipulations, under the pretext of "self-determination."

The simplest method was to accept a fictitious "right of self-determination" in the regions occupied by Germany. In fact, we had already received a report concerning the "self-determination" of Dvinsk (on the railroad from Warsaw to Petrograd and from Riga to Moscow, Warsaw in Poland and Riga in Courland being under German control) who desired to become part of Courland. We also heard from the delegation in the White Ruthenian regions (the governments of Grodno, Vilna, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Mohilef and Minsk—the region between Warsaw to a short distance from Moscow) that they wished to withdraw from the sovereignty of Russia.

Section 7 of the treaty of Brest provides that a special commission determine the boundaries of those regions that withdrew from Russia. When this commission convened at Pskov (between Dvinsk and Petrograd) it was empowered, by the consent of both governments to determine definitely the boundaries of the regions occupied by Germany. However, after the first session of this commission, their work was interrupted, and has not been continued since.

The following proposition was submitted by the Germans: that the basis for the right of self-determination be established on the boundaries of German occupation; that every landowner whose land was bounded by the German line of occupation should have the privilege of deciding to which side (Germany or our side) his property should belong in the future. The solution of this question of principle was referred to Berlin, where the Political Commission (a mixed commission of Soviet representatives and Germans) will be occupied with it.

The position of the occupied regions is not as yet clear. The German government informed us that the railroad employees would retain their former wages, and enjoy all advantages as to the division of the necessities of life and that malicious agitators were spreading rumors amongst the employees that all those who continued their work under German occupation would lose their employment, their pension, and all their savings when later the now occupied territories were restored to Russia. Therefore, the German government requested us to send a public notice to the occupied districts containing the information that these rumors were baseless and that the Russian government recommended that the railroad employees continue with their work. However, we found u[on direct information that the wages of the railroad employes were reduced fifty per cent, and that these employees and all other officers were subjected to all kinds of persecution and that they did not enjoy advantage in regard to the necessities of life.

We informed the German government that we could not take any part in the responsibility of the administration of the occupied district as long as the German government insisted upon deposing all Soviets and continued to destroy traces of the Soviet system. The question of the internal administration of the occupied sections had also to be referred to the Political Commission in Berlin.