Page:The Proletarian Revolution in Russia - Lenin, Trotsky and Chicherin - ed. Louis C. Fraina (1918).djvu/437

 At last the German troops landed in the vicinity of Porte (harbor in the South Caucasus on the Black Sea) while the Finnish troops on the other side began their march in the Caucasus in the direction of Baku (on the Caspian Sea). This critical period was settled on the Finnish frontier by an agreement between the German and the Russian governments concerning a basis for a treaty between Russia and Finland. A gradual relaxing of military skirmishes on the Ukraine front was directly noticeable, caused by the beginning of peace negotiations in Kiev between Russia and the Hetman government.

The result of our so sharply conducted political dealing was: the retreat of that part of the Russian fleet (the Black Sea fleet) to Sebastopol and from there it sailed to Noworossysk (the harbor of the German menaced Kuban district). The demand for the return of this district was considered as an indispensable condition to territorial, as well as political and economic relations between Soviet Russia and German Ukraine.

Up to this moment (beginning of July, 1918) the most critical question seems to concern the Caucasus and can be attended by grave consequences, also the crisis in the Don, where counter-revolutionary activity is not yet settled. But the retreat of the fleet to Sebastopol made it possible for the mixed commission in Berlin to commence its work. This commission was made up of two parts: one a financial and judical committee w4iose work consisted in planning a basis for peaceful economic relations between Russia and Germany; the other, a political committee whose task it was to solve the questions arising out of the Brest-Litovsk treaty.

The new negative moment in the relation between Russia and her former Allies was the uprising of the Czecho-Slovaks. In this case it developed that the governments or the Entente stood with those elements who, like the Czecho-Slovaks, served to support the counter-revolution in Russia.

Directly after these events followed the landing of English troops on the Murman Coast and in the press and the declaration of the diplomats the question of intervention becomes more pronounced. But those elements in the Entente countries whose aim is to reach a complete and friendly relation with Soviet Russia continue their struggle, and reveal at the same time the extraordinary shortsightedness of the policy of attacking Russia. Thus we see how complicated the problems are that the Soviet Commissaires are called upon to solve; we have been careful in our deliberations to avoid all dangers which would lead to irreparable actions from the side of our opponents, and have taken all possible steps to bring about a peaceful solution of our difficulties with both coalitions.

The relations of Russia to the states of Central Europe were determined by the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the principal part of our policy in relation to Germany was to execute this treaty. The indistinctness, the as yet undecided agreements and the imperfection of the treaty of Brest encouraged the exponents of the annexationist policy to develop this policy still further, with regard to Russia.

The treaty of Brest is not distinct as to the boundaries of the territory occupied by Germany, and yet it determined that at the moment of the signing of the treaty all further progress should cease. The treaty leaves the situation of territories occupied by Germany an open question. The territory of the Ukraine is not defined, and the question of the boundaries of the Ukraine,