Page:The Proletarian Revolution in Russia - Lenin, Trotsky and Chicherin - ed. Louis C. Fraina (1918).djvu/435



During the period that followed the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace, we find that our foreign policy developed along different lines than those followed during the first few months after the November Revolution. The basis of our foreign policy since the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 has been a revolutionary offensive.

This policy kept step with an immediately expected World Revolution for which the Russian November Revolution would have been the signal. It was especially meant to reach the revolutionary proletariat of all countries and to arouse them to combat Imperialism and the present capitalist system of society. (We remind our readers that at this time until the peace of Brest-Litovsk, not Tschitcherin, but Trotzky, was People's Commissaire for Foreign Affairs.)

After the proletariat of other countries refused their direct support for the destruction of revolutionary Russia, our foreign policy was radically changed through the occupation of Finland, the Ukraine, the Baltic Provinces, Poland, Lithuania and White Russia by the armies of German-Austrian Imperialism. In the last four months (March to June, 1918) we were compelled to make it our object to avoid all the dangers which menaced us from all sides and to gain as much time as possible: in the first place, to assist the growth of the proletarian movements in other countries, and in the second place, to establish more firmly the political and social ideals of the Soviet government amongst the broad masses of the people of Russia and to bring about their united support for the program of the Soviets.

Soviet Russia, with as yet no force sufficient to protect its own boundaries, surrounded by enemies waiting for its downfall, suffering from a period of unbelievable deterioration caused by the war and Czarism, and always cognizant of the dangers which threatened it at every step, had to be constantly vigilant in its foreign policy. The policy of delay was possible thanks to the diversity of interest, not only of both coalitions (the Central Powers and the Allied Powers), but also within each of these groups and in the respective Imperialism of all the warring countries. The position on the Western Front (Belgium-France) bound the powers of both coalitions temporarily to such an extent that neither of the two decided to aim at the direct and entire destruction of Russia.

A section of these imperialistic groups in both coalitions thinks of the future, of after the war, of economic relations with Russia, with this world market so especially ripe for development. This element on both coalitions would prefer a compromise instead of an annexation policy for the sake of economic advantages. The hope to embroil Russia in the war, while her