Page:The Proletarian Revolution in Russia - Lenin, Trotsky and Chicherin - ed. Louis C. Fraina (1918).djvu/287

 tionary Russia,—Minister of War Guchkov, or Minister of War Kerensky?" (Shouts of "bravo!" and applause).

Tseretelli is thus openly boasting of the fact that Kerensky is carrying out the very work that Guchkov would have carried out, but which, as the latter did not have the credit of "revolutionary" democracy to draw on, turned out to be too much for him. And the bourgeoisie in spite of the catastrophe that was called forth by die offensive, gladly recognizes the services of Kerensky.

"We know and we shall remember," declared the Cadet Nabokov, at the Moscow Conference, "that the great burst of enthusiasm in the Russian army two months ago, which in those horrible days added a new glorious page to our history, was inspired by the man who now stands at the head of the Provisional Government. History will never forget his service at this moment."

It is consequently quite clear that the "glorious page" of the offensive of the 1st of July has no relation whatever to national defense, for the military efficiency of Russia, as the consequence of the offensive, had simply been made worse. If the bourgeoisie neverthlessnevertheless [sic] speaks of the offensive in terms of appreciation, it is for the simple reason that the cruel blow inflicted upon our army as a result of Kerensky's policy created favorable conditions for the spread of panic and for counter-revolutionary schemes. All the authority of the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik democracy had been exerted in the direction of forcing an offensive, and the latter completely wiped out that regime of contradictions and insolvency, to the support of which the philistine leaders had applied all their narrow-minded ingenuity.

Both the offensive and the question of peace are now being considered by the bourgeoisie and its generals from the angle of internal politics, that is, for the advancement of the counter-revolution. This was most clearly expressed at the Moscow Conference by General Kornilov. "Peace cannot at present be attained," he said, "if only for the reason that we are not in a position to carry out demobilization. We must first elevate the prestige of the officers." In the army there had been concentrated too many persons armed by the government, who were directing demands to the government, that were all too radical. Only a continuation of the war, regardless of the chances of success, would provide a possibility for "elevating the prestige of the officers," for regaining control of the military masses, and for assuring a demobiliza-