Page:The Proletarian Revolution in Russia - Lenin, Trotsky and Chicherin - ed. Louis C. Fraina (1918).djvu/285

 mental criticism, we pointed out that in the present state of the army an offensive was a military adventure, which threatened the very existence of the army itself. It transpired that we had seen only too clearly. The government had discounted nothing and foreseen nothing. The government party of Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki had been hurling denunciations at us instead of availing themselves of our suggestions.

Naturally, as the Bolsheviki had foretold this disaster, blame was put upon—the Bolsheviki. Behind the tragedy which was brought forth by ignorance and irresponsibility, there loomed cowardice in all its wretchedness. All the moulders of our destinies felt no more urgent duty than to find a scape-goat on whom to put the blame. The semi-official speeches and articles of these days will stand forever as monuments to human baseness.

The hounding of the Bolsheviki may, to be sure, still confuse the issue for a time in the minds of the people. But it cannot eliminate nor in any way weaken the significance of the question of the responsibility of the government. Whether the Bolsheviki are guilty or not, how is it that the government foresaw nothing? It appears to have had no understanding of the very army it had sent into battle. Without for a moment considering whether the army was capable of understanding an offensive, they ordered the army to move forward. And those at the head of the government were not Bolsheviki. Whatever may have been the facts with regard to the latter, the full weight of the responsibility for the tragic adventure of the offensive is upon the shoulders of the government of Kerensky, Tseretelli and Chernov.

This responsibility is increased by the fact that the warning voices do not at all appear to have come from the camp of the internationalists. The imperialistic Novoye Vremye, which is in close relations with the reactionary general staff, had the following to say, on August 5th, concerning the preparations for the offensive:

"The cautious Alekseieff, because he did not wish to hurl unprepared forces into slaughter, because he did not wish to jeopardize for questionable results, the gains already made,—was retired. The illusion of success, the longing for an early peace, which Germany should be forced to accept from the Petrograd ringleaders, brought Brussilov to the top of the wave, and promptly submerged him when the billows broke."

These eloquent lines explain and confirm the confused remarks of Retch, at the time of Alekseieff's resignation, concerning