Page:The Proletarian Revolution in Russia - Lenin, Trotsky and Chicherin - ed. Louis C. Fraina (1918).djvu/193

 vigorous prosecution of the war and declared that "the question of an offensive must be decided exclusively from the point of view of purely military and strategic considerations." Kerensky as Minister of War made all the necessary preparations, and on July 1 the offensive was launched against the Austro-German lines in Galicia. The offensive was temporarily successful, but then came the counter-atttacksattacks [sic] of the enemy and the offensive was smothered in its own insufficiency. The offensive was a military adventure of the most deplorable character; under the circumstances, it was sheer murder of the Russian soldiers, who were unprepared. In spite of the declaration of the All-Russian Congress, that an offensive was "purely military and strategic," the offensive of July 1 was determined by political considerations. It was a maneuvre to restore "discipline" in the army, to strike at the revolutionary opposition and strengthen he hands of the Provisional Government. It was, moreover, determined by diplomatic considerations: relations between Russia and the Allies were being strained by Russia's apparent refusal to fight The pressure of the Allies and the necessity of securing their financial assistance determined the inauguration of the offensive. The Bolshevist organ Pravda openly asserted this character of the offensive. And, to be sure, the Provisional Government was in an impasse, because of its bourgeois and imperialistic policy.

The political results of the offensive were important. On July 18 the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates approved the offensive. The reaction was strengthened and moderates and government became more thoroughly one and reactionary. On July 15 a ministerial crisis flared up, resulting in the resignation of five Cadet members from the Cabinet on the issue of Ukrainian autonomy. This was a challenge to the Soviets and a repudiation of the government's liberal policy.

But, simultaneously, the masses were aroused, determined upon action to defend the Revolution. The trend of events was too definitely counter-revolutionary to be accepted silently. And again the masses of Petrograd, always actively on the aggressive, determined to act On July 15 the Government ordered the Petrograd Machine-Gun Regiment to the front; it refused to go, declaring it would not fight for Anglo-French Imperialism, and would obey only if the Government published the secret treaties. Two other regiments acted similarly. A demonstration was agreed upon and organized for July 17. All parties, including the Bolsheviki, tried to prevent the demonstration, the Bolsheviki because they knew counter-revolutionary gangs were prepared to provoke a dash, which under the conditions they considered premature. ThThe [sic] ExcutiveExecutive [sic] Committee of the All-Russian Soviets issued a proclamation against the demonstration, mentioning that several detachments of soldiers had demanded that it "take over all power." But the determination of the masses of workers and soldiers was inflexible, and in spite of all opposition a demonstration was agreed upon, and an armed demonstration, moreover, symbol of their purpose to use force if a peaceful demonstration was unsuccessful. The Bolsheviki, realizing the strength of the masses' sentiments, participated in the demonstration as the party of the revolutionary masses. As was anticipated, the peaceful demonstration was converted into an armed uprising by the armed interference and provocation