Page:The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (1910).djvu/25

Rh ment, and Mashrúṭa-khwáh means one who desires such “conditioned” or constitutional rule, instead of the old autocracy or absolutism (Istibdád), which made the King the uncontrolled arbiter of his people’s destinies, and the unquestioned master of their lives, honour and possessions. Millat means “the People” or “the Nation,” and is opposed to Dawlat, “the State,” “the Government,” or practically, under the old régime, “the Court.” The Mashrúṭa-khwáh, or Constitutionalist, is opposed to the Mustabidd, or partisan of the Autocracy, and perhaps these terms might best be rendered by “Parliamentarian” and “Royalist.” Here the antithesis is natural and familiar enough, but the antithesis between the Millatí and the Dawlatí needs a few words of comment. Under ideal conditions it is evident that there should be no such antithesis, and that the interests of the State (Dawlat) and of the People or Nation (Millat) should be identical, or at least closely related. And the Persians are by nature so obedient and so loyal to their Kings (“Sháh-parast,” “King-worshippers,” as they say) that I do not myself believe that the demand for popular or constitutional government would have arisen at all, or at any rate in our time, if recent Sháhs of Persia had shewn themselves even moderately patriotic, or just, or far-sighted. Against a Sháh Isma‘íl, an ‘Abbás the Great, or a Karím Khán the Persians would never have revolted. It was when they became convinced that their country was despised abroad, that their interests were betrayed for a vile price, and that their religion and their independent existence as a nation were alike threatened with destruction, that they began to demand a share in the government of their country. Many European journalists and other writers have made merry over the idea of a Persian Parliament, repeating like so many parrots the expression “comic opera” on almost every page. Yet I venture to think that there was more reality and more grim determination in this Persian struggle than in our own English politics, with their lack of guiding principles, their conferences, their coalitions, and their sham conflicts. Throughout the struggle the Persians have consciously been fighting for their very existence as a Nation, and in this sense the popular or constitutional party may very