Page:The Next Naval War - Eardley-Wilmot - 1894.djvu/53

 was liable to destruction in detail or to suffer blockade. By developing the resources of Toulon, and collecting a fleet there considerably superior to any in Mediterranean waters, it could not—in the early stages of a war at least—be reduced to inactivity. Of course I am aware that this measure had been to a large extent influenced by the growth of the Italian Navy, and the chances of hostilities with the Triple Alliance. This, however, was only one of many threads in a scheme which had for its chief ambition a dominion of the sea.

But the greatest change of all in the strategical aspect of the Mediterranean, as regards the position of France and England, is the substitution of the former in holding the large extent of coast formerly under the authority of the Deys of Algiers and Tunis. When the French sent an expedition to Algiers in 1830, it was not, probably, foreseen by the other Powers that this would lead to a domination of the coast to a point within easy range of Malta. Along this coast are a series of harbours either naturally good or made so artificially. Such harbours afford valuable bases either for offensive or defensive purposes. The most ignorant in naval warfare cannot fail to see what risks in war commerce runs in passing this long sea coast, unless each port is masked or the craft it harbours destroyed. A squadron leaving Toulon need not fear loss of communication and supplies with such a base as Algiers open—moreover, any force going