Page:The Next Naval War - Eardley-Wilmot - 1894.djvu/19

 of the two services sketched the operations to be adopted in case the result should be unfavourable. This led to some curious revelations. Hach had a plan of campaign cut and dried for such an eventuality, but it had been prepared without reference to the other, and its success depended on a preliminary warning of at least some days. To the Army had been confided the task of defending all the ports and our outlying possessions, but it had never struck its officials to inquire what the nature of the attack might be coming over sea, and it was assumed that an expedition could be as easily equipped for distant service aS for a dash at pomts within easy range. Having been told they could expect no assistance from the fleet, that is to say, ships could not be permanently retained in any locality to await an attack which might never come, the military scheme of defence provided for resisting a large fleet and the landing of a numerous body of troops. Such a view entailed small armies in each place for garrisons, so that in the words of a former Secretary of State for War, "The garrisoning of the ports and coaling stations would require the services of no less than 125,000 men, in addition to local levies in certain foreign stations." These had not been provided, and now the Admiralty were suddenly asked to provide transport and convoy for the troops required to complete the garrisons to full strength. It required some