Page:The New Monthly Magazine - Volume 097.djvu/394

380 Deem that our puny boundaries are things

That we perceive, and not that we have made.

In his purest speculations he is too entirely saturated with the Aristotelian spirit to lose himself in Platonic dream-worlds, and too genuine a representative (more robust and independent, however, than ant dead or living confrère) of the esprit Ecossais, and its Baconian tendencies, to deal with logic and its subtleties as an end, not a means.

The section of these "Discussions" which is devoted to literature and miscellaneous questions, holds out naturally the chief, perhaps the only, attraction to general readers: among the subjects of discussion being, the Instruction of the Deaf and Dumb, the Revolutions of Medicine (from the humourism of Galen to the solidism of Hoffman and Boerhaave), the Study of Mathematics as an Exercise of Mind, the Conditions of Classical Learning, the State of the English Universities, and that celebrated German satire, the Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum. The review of the last is an admirable specimen of Sir William's range of powers, natural and acquired, and a worthy treatise on a work which, by the testimony of Herder, effected for Germany incomparably more than Hudibras for England, or Garagantua for France, or the Knight of La Mancha for Spain,—which gave the victory to Reuchlin over the Begging Friars, and to Luther over the Court of Rome—"and never, certainly, were unconscious barbarism, self-glorious ignorance, intolerant stupidity, and sanctimonious immorality, so ludicrously delineated; never, certainly, did delineation less betray the artifice of ridicule." The inquiry into the value of Mathematics as an engrossing study, is another highly characteristic paper—a perfect curiosity as a repertory of authorities pro and con.: the writer's conclusion being, that an excessive study of mathematics not only does not prepare, but absolutely incapacitates the mind, for those intellectual energies which philosophy and life require—disqualifying us for observation, either internal or external, for abstraction and generalisation, and for common reasoning; nay, disposing us to the alternative of blind credulity or irrational scepticism. Very striking passages in confirmation of his views, that mathematics are not a logical exercise, and that in no sense is geometry a substitute for logic, are cited by Sir William from a host of witnesses—many of them distinguished highly in mathematical science—such as Aristotle, D'Alembert, Descartes, Pascal, Arnauld, Du Hamel, Joseph Scaliger, Le Clerc, Buddeus, Basedow, Gibbon, Berkeley, Goethe, Dugald Stewart, De Staël, &c., &c. But if there is one investigation in this volume, which, more than another, may be recommended to all who would appreciate, after their manner, the veteran Professor's grasp of thought, system of metaphysical doctrine, and lucid elaboration of ideas necessarily obscure in themselves, we incline to name the thesis "On the Philosophy of the Unconditioned"—though the bare name may suffice to repel those ab extra, especially when the alias of the article is added, "In reference to Cousin's Infinito