Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 19.djvu/585

* TRUSTS. 507 TRUSTS. ness of individuals or corporations by enactments that are not intended j>riniarily for the purpose of controlling or regulating interstate cuuimurce, but for the purpose of restricting, or making un- lawful, or assuming control over, a business which is lawful and uiu'cstrictcd in the several States, is without limitation, since that question has not been delinitcly and finally determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Acting under its power to regulate commerce. Congress in 1SS7 enacted the Interstate Commerce Act, having for its purpose the control and regula- tion of business carried on by common carriers engaged in interstate commerce. Its particular object was the prevention of unlawful discrimina- tion in rates by common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, which had contributed in a large degree to the growth of monopolistic enter- prises. This was followed in 1S90 by a statute for the protection of interstate and international trade, commonlv known as the Sherman Act (-0 United States Statutes at Large, 209). This statute provides that all contracts, com- binations in form of Trusts or otherwise, or conspiracies in restraint of interstate or inter- national commerce are illegal, and that all per- sons participating in such agreement, combina- tion, or conspiracy are guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a penalty for violation of the act. The statute also provides that all goods in transportation in violation of the act may be seized, and their forfeiture compelled by a pro- ceeding brought in behalf of the Government, and that a proceeding may be brought by the Attor- ney-General enjoining all acts in violation of the statute and for the dissolution of contracts entered into in violation of it. It has been held by the courts that this act does not apply to monopolies created and au- thorized by a State, but that it is intended to apply to all direct restraints of trade by in- dividuals or corporations, whether such restraints would have been deemed reasonable or unrea- sonable at common law. The restraint or monopoly need not be complete. The statute is violated if the contract or combination tends to such monopoly. Notwithstanding the scope and severity of the statute, it has been found not to be particularly effective in restraining the growth of monopolies or Trusts, so called, and it is not unlikely that further legislation of a similar character will be enacted. In the Congressional session of 1902-03 the law creating the Department of Commerce and Labor made provision for a Bureau of Corpora- tions, whose duty it should be to collect full data regarding Trusts, with the purpose of thus ac- quiring information which might be used, if deemed advisable, for further legislation. The President was given power to make public such of this information as he thinks wise, in order that through the remedy of publicity some of the evils might possibly be checked. Likewise, the Interstate Commerce Act was amended by the so-called Elkins law, which, it is thought, will prevent, better than the previous provisions of the law could do, discriminations in railroad rates. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the ITnited States Circuit Court, both in earlier cases, and especially in Vol. XIX.— 33. the case of the Northern Securities Company, in- dicate that the Federal Government has the power to prevent combinations among railroads or manufacturing corj)orations .engaged in inter- state commerce which are created for the pur- pose of securing monopoly, or which in actual practice do tend toward restraint of trade, and that whether this restraint is reasonable or un- reasonable. The English Government has gone no further in the way of anti-monopoly legislation than the old provisions of the common law against monopoly and the somewhat rigid provisions of their corporation act regarding publicity in the promotion and management of companies. In France the status of the law seems not to be definitely fixed, for although there are statutes existing against combinations to influence prices, and although there have been certain successful prosecutions under this law, notably in the case of the Copper Syndicate, still industrial com- binations in the form of joint selling bureaus do exist without apparent legal opposition. In Ciermany, contracts for fixing prices, con- trolling output, or in other ways tending toward the prevention of destructive competition have been upheld by the courts as reasonable, and the restriction of such combinations is apparently limited to those that can be shown to be contrary to public policy. In Austria the Government has made efforts to put the combinations under some- what more rigid supervision, especially for finan- cial reasons, but although there has been consider- able feeling against the Trusts, as yet compara- tively little has been done by either the legislature or the courts, and some very strong combinations have been in existence there for several years. Iloth in Austria and in Germany, however," Gov- ernment commissions have been studying the subject with reference to further legislation, and so far as their recommendations go, the in- clination is to recognize the combinations as proper, provided they place themselves suf- ficiently under Government supervision and con- duct their business so that it will not be consid- ered by the Government officials as contrary to public policy. BiBLioGR.iPHY. Steinniann-Bucher. JVesen und licdeutung der geicerUichen Eartelle (Leipzig, 1891) ; Halle, Trusts or Industrial Combinations (New York, 1895) ; Lief man. Die Vnternehmcr- vcrhiinde (Leipzig, 1897); Pohle, Die Eartelle der gewerhlicheti Unternehmer (ib.. 1898) ; Rousiers, Les industries monopoUsfes (Paris, 1898) ; Baker, Monopolies and the People (New York, 1899) ; Corporafiotis and Public T]'elfare, report 4th annual meeting, American Acad- emy of Political and Social Science (ib., 1900) ; Report of Chicnrio Conference on Trusts (Chicago, 1900); Collier, Trusts (New York, 1900) ; Ely. Monopolies and Trusis (ib.. 1900) ; .Tcnks. Industrial Combinations. Bulletin of department of Labor ( Washinarton. 1900); id.. The Trust Problem (4th ed.. New York. 1903) ; Reports of the United f^fafes Industrial Com- mission, vols. i.. ii., xiii., x'iii. and xix. (Wash- ington. 1900-1902) : Trusts and Trade Combina- tions in Europe. State Department, Consular Reports, vol. xxi. (ib.. 1900): Le Rossignol, Monopolies Past and Present (New York. 1901) ; Raffalovich. Les trusts (Paris, 1903). Also con- sult the authorities referred to under such titles