Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 19.djvu/236

* THEISM. 192 THEME. val period gave it their support because they found in it the ground of the harmony of specu- Iatix' reason and piety. In modern times philosophical meanings have largely supplanted the theological. Thus Des- cartes, the most important modern thinker on this subject, developed his theism onlj' after sweeping aside all presuppositions derived from a supernatural source or from the s.ymbols of the Church. Starting with the bare fact of thought (cogito, cryo sum), he argues that there must be an adequate cause for the thought of God in the mind. By this thought Descartes says that he means "a substance infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-power- ful ; by whi'ch 1 myself and every other thing have been produced." (lied, iii.) Now this thought cannot be a mere negation ; for it has reality. Nor can it have arisen by adding many ideas together: for it is simple. Could it have arisen as a result of my growing intelligence? No; because the idea docs not admit of growth: God is infinite always and does not admit of more or less. Hence the idea must have a divine origin. A second luoof may be stated thus. We need this idea in order to explain to us the immediate existence and continuance of the universe. God is not only needed as a Creator, or logical Prius of the universe, but much more as a Preserver. A merely primary creative cause might be lost in the infinite complex of secondary causes, as in pantheism or deism, but the immediate dependence and continuance of the universe involves the idea of a preserving and sustaining cause, not only that of an orig- inating one. A true cause nuist, therefore, be adequate to the task of continuing the universe from moment to moment. The existence now of a universe involves the self-existence of its absolute Cause. As a third proof Descartes re- vived Anselm's so-called ontological argument, i.e. the argument from the idea of a most perfect being to its existence. Reality, in his view, is as much a part of the idea of a perfect being, as the angles of a triangle are of the essence of our idea of a triangle, or the perfume of a rose of our idea of a rose. Kant, in the third part of his Dialectic, criticises this argument of Descartes. He does not, indeed, deny the fact that we have the idea of a perfect being, but he doubts if from the idea we have an.v right to infer its real existence, since it is possible for us to have an idea (for ex- ample, of a centaur) that does not correspond to any object. And inasmuch as all possible proofs of the existence of God are reducible to this one, the ontological, Kant considers that all the argu- ments of Descartes and of the mediaeval thinkers failed to establish their point. Accordingly he proposed a new and infallible proof, the so- called practical or moral arguments for the existence of God, which is as follows. We have the notion of a moral law; conscience responds to the categorical moral imperative. Universal experience proves that happiness and virtue in- volve each other and cannot be separated. Obe- dience to these moral conditions is the law of life, of conduct, and character: for the wicked are never, in the long run, happy. Now, said Kant, for this conviction there is needed a cause, supreme and infinite; a cause capable of clinch- ing this relation between happiness and virtue to all eternity; a cause which will secure the triumph of justice as against the moral in- equalities of the present life. This moral cause we call, by faith, God. Thus the only ground for insisting on 'proofs' of the existence of this cause is for Kant the subjective need of a cause of the moral law within our souls, and further than this Ivant held it was impossible for the human mind to go. Hegel disagreed i Kant's conclusions, and sought to revive the ontological argument of Anselm and Descartes, in a new form, contending that the idea of a jierfect being was an expres- sion of the nature of all thought and all reality. He refused to believe that the traditional sepa- ration of thought and thing, upon which Kant depended, represented any real or valuable dis- tinction. For him thought and reality are the same. We cannot ever get 'be.vond' thought. To [)ut a barrier, as Kant did, between thought and thing is, for Hegel, to cease to think. All recent retlection on the theistic problem rests on this idealistic presupposition of Hegel. He may, therefore, be regarded as furnishing present- day theism with its most valuable logical founda- tion. Consult; Harris, The Philosophical Basis of Theism (New York, 1883) ; Flint, Theism^ (Edin- burgh, 1887 ) ; Ladd, The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture (New York, 1884) ; Bowne, Theism (ib., 190.3) : Fisher, Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief (ib., 1883; new ed., ib., 1903). THEISS, tls (Hung. Tisza, Lat. Tissus) . The largest tributary of the Danube, and, next to the latter, the principal river of Hungary (Map: Hungary, G 3) . It rises in the Carpathian Moun- tains and flows first westward, then south, the lower half of its course being parallel with that of the Danulie below Budapest. It joins the Danube about 30 miles above Belgrade. Its total length, including the smallest windings, is about 800 miles. In its npper course through the nar- row mountain passes it is rapid and clear, but in the great plain of Central Hungary it is very sluggish, and winds between low. marshy banks. The country here is subject to disastrous inunda- tions, and large sums have been expended in at- tempts to regulate the flow of the river and drain the marshes. The Theiss is navigable for boats to Miirmaros-Sziget near its source, but steam- boats ascend generally only to Szegedin at the mouth of the Maros (q.v.). the chief tributary. From the lower course of the river a canal runs westward to the Danube. The Theiss is famous for its fish. THELLUSSON (tellus-son, or Fr. pron., ta'- Iu'son') ACT. See Perpetuity. THEME (Lat. thema, from Gk. e^ij.a, thing laid down, deposit, prize, proposition, subject, from Tidh'ai, tithenni, to set. place: connected with Skt. dhii. OChurch Slav. deti. Lat. condere, to put. place, OHG. tiion, Ger. thun. AS. dnn. Eng. do). In music, a term which is in a general sense svnonvmous with subject or motive (q.v.). Every composition is built up from themes which constitute the basic material. In a specific sense, the theme of a fugue is the subject (dux). In variations the theme is a complete musical idea, generally of periodic structure. It is always played in its entirety before the variations be- gin. See Sonata; Symphony.