Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 18.djvu/925

* TACTICS. 811 TACTICS. tillery cannot deal with, and for which the ar- rival of the siege artillery material cannot be awaited. It must combine great power with a mobility sufficient to enable it to keep up with the troops. Since they are necessarily some dis- tance behind the other troops on the road, the arrival of these batteries must be awaited. They are used very much like the field batteries, but in the selection of the positions there will usually be more freedom, and their duties and changes of position are ordered only by the commander-in- chief. TACTICS OF THE THREE ABMS COMBINED. For most efficient action all three arms are combined, although under certain circumstances and in small bodies infantry and cavalry can act alone, and under others only two of the arms are combined, as infantry and cavalry, in- fantry and artillery, and cavalry and artillery. The addition of artillery to the larger bodies of cavalry confers on the latter the possibility of preparing its attack by artillery fire and strengthening its line when fighting on foot ; but the absence of infantry prevents it from fight- ing an infantry enemy in difficult ground, or in villages, woods, or intrenchments. It is there- fore used mainly in reconnaissance and pursuit. The addition of artillery to infantry greatly in- creases the offensive and defensive power of the latter ; but absence of cavalry prevents this com- bination from obtaining timely information of the enemy or properly screening the forces from his view. The addition of cavalrj' to infantry confers on the latter security on the march and in battle; but for reconnaissance or pursuit the presence of the infantry interferes with the mo- bility of the combination, and for battle it is weak in offense or defense, due to the absence of artillery. The combination of the three arms is, there- fore, the only complete one for the battlefield. TROOP LEADING. The principles of troop leading belong mainly in the domain of strategy; that of tactics is far more limited, because the subordinate commander usually receives the plan of operations from higher authority; nevertheless, he must often act independently. Every action of a commander should be based on a definite purpose, but often the original plan may have been based on false premises, because in war the circumstances are rarely clear. Even a division commander can rarely be fully informed of the condition of his entire division, much less an army corps com- mander. Moreover, after making dispositions, the conditions may have entirely changed since the receipt of the reports on which they were based, and this is particularly true of cavalry forces, where events succeed one another so rapidly. These are some of the diflSculties a commander has' to contend with. The position taken by the commander in person is of great importance. Aside from the moral effect the commander must be influenced by the theatre of ■war and must have his hand on the pulse of his army; finally, in the critical moments his position is at the front where the decisive action must take place. The headquarters may remain in rear, but the leader himself must be at the front. In spite of all the modem aids to recon- naissance and the transmission of reports, in spite of telegraph, railroad, bicycle, automobile. in spite of heliograph, balloon, and carrier pigeon, the veil covering the enemy has with time grown more and more impenetrable, due more particularly to the great masses involved in modern armies, the immense space covered, the greater rapidity of movement, and the increased effect of firearms. Still, the conunander who decides to wait for definite information, espe- cially as regards the strength of the enemy, will wait in vain. In this connection it nuist be remembered that the value of the initiative for the successful execution of an undertaking can- not be overestimated ; it often makes up for a poor plan.* The greater tlie sphere of action the more difficult it is to get a clear idea of the entire situation, for the commander must have in mind a definite conception of the state of affairs on the enemy's front, at the lipa<Is of his own columns, and of the entire field, .ind tliis must be derived from the innumerable messages and reports, regarding the enemy, his own troops, and the lines of communication, coming in from all directions. The picture is probably never perfectly true, but on the whole it must sum up the situation correctly, for on it are based the orders issued to the troops, and the latter must always aim at a decisive action. Considering all the difficulties, it is evident that even the ablest leader cannot attend to all the duties of his position personally, and requires assistants ; in other words, a st.aff. The leader must be fully responsible for all his decisions; the rest of the work his staff must relieve him of. Especially does he need an officer to look over and arrange the incoming reports of recon- naissance, and in large commands this is placed under a separate bureau, where the dispatches are filed, and only the important ones, or a num- ber of connected ones, placed before the com- mander. See Staff. In carrying out the various operations and manceuvres here described much depends upon the completeness and elliciency of the organiza- tion of the army, consequently the subject of organization is closely associated with tactics. Therefore, in this connection the reader should consult the article Army Organization and the articles Armies; Artillery; Cavalry; Infan- try; Mounted Infantry; Staff; Advance Guard; Outpost; Reconnaissance; and Bat- tle. The various arms and materials of war mentioned mil be found treated either under such collective titles as Ordnance and Small Arms, or under their own heads. Bibliography. Shaw, The Elements of Mod- ern Tartics (London, 1894) ; Wagner. Offiani^a- tion and Tactics (Kansas City, 1896) ; Dickhut, natidbuch der Trupprnfiihrung ini Kriei/c (Ber- lin, 1901) ; Hohenlohe, Letters on Infantr;/, Cav- alrif. and ArtiUery (Eng. trans.. London. 1.890) ; Wisser, Practical Problems in l^trate/jji and Tac- tics (New York, 1902) ; Wagner, The S^errice of f^ecnritj/ and Information (1896) : De Oruyther, Tactics for Ber/inners (London, 1899) : Ouenther, Aliriss der Tnktik (Zurich. 189.5) : Von der Ooltz, Kriefifilhninri (Berlin. 189.'i) ; Wisser, The Hecnnd Pner War, a tactical study (Kan- sas City, 1900): Libbrecht, Attaijue ci d<<fpnse des places (1888-9,')); Lauth. J/i'tat militaire des puissances Mranfiires (Paris, 1894) ; Loebell, Jahresherichte (Berlin, annual).