Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 18.djvu/921

* TACTICS. 807 TACTICS. line. These conditions will constantly change in all the different parts of the field. The infantry attack is decided by fire-action, and to determine the number of skirmishers in the firing line, it must be remembered that there should be at least enough to prevent surprises, and not so many as to interfere with the com- mander's freeilom of action, in case, for example, it should turn out that a considerable portion of the forces )iad been placed where they were not really needed. The further development of the fire-action will be determined by the points se- lected for decisive action, which cannot usually be determined beforehand. One of the principal conditions for the success of the attack is that fire once opened should be kept up to about the same strength, and this again indicates the necessity for comparatively weak lines at first; on the other hand, the enemy should be met with superior forces from the beginning, and this superiority kept up. Be- tween these two limits the commander must de- cide. THE FLANK ATTACK. The attack covers the entire front of the defense and has !n addition sufficient troops for outflanliintJ: tile rij^ht wing of the latter, and attacliing him in a direction perpendicu- lar to his trout. Decisive action is usually sought on a flank, but not necessarily an extreme outer flank of the line, for a modern skirmish lino, from various causes, is very apt to have a number of inner flanks, which are also points of weakness. In the early part of the engagement the enemy must be forced to unveil his position, and then these interior flanks can be determined, and the commander may decide where to concen- trate his forces, for superiority is desired only at the decisive points. The rest of the front can be held by comparatively weak forces. This also indicates the necessity for keeping as many troops as possible in reserve, but it must be borne in mind that the requisite number to insure su- periority must be put in the firing line from the beginning, and this aside from all other consider- ations. The reserves must be added to the firing line in dispersed order, for the commander who hopes to force a decisive action by means of re- serves in closed order disregards the effects of modern firearms. In an ideal action all the rifles are in use at the decisive moment, but this is not possible in long lines. Still, the troops remaining in close formation will find other uses. To cover a retiring skirmish line only those re- serves can be used that stand far enough to the rear to be readily placed in a defensive position to which the line may fall back; if they are al- ready on the way to the front they had better be thrown into the skirmish line, to turn the tide, if possible. Breaking through the front of a line is a very difficult un<lertaking and hardly possible today. Consetjuently, the reserves should not be in rear of the centre, because they are of no use there, and would have to be kept so far in rear, to avoid the effects of the enemy's fire, that they might n.ot enter the action in time. Their place is on one or both flanks, and so far beyond the flanks that they can enter the fight by a simple, direct forward movement, without any lateral gaining of ground. A regiment held in reserve, for example, should be placed in rear of the flank and about GOO yards bevond it. The main reserve is always beliind the ilank where the decisive ac- tion is expected to be brought about. The regimental commander can only assign to each battalion its general duty; the executiim must be left to the battalion commanders. On the defensive he assigns to each his section of ground, on the offensive his point of attack; and he lets go his control as fast as the circumstances require. The battalion commander, in the same way, gradually gives up control of his companies, and when once the battalion is deployed, he can only aid by earing for the sujiply of ammunition. A skirmish line fires only when at a halt, and the position taken depends on the range, but lying prone is now regarded as best because it gives the enemy's artillery no opportunity to get the range. Before opening fire the distance must be estimated, a difficult matter even for those well trained in it in time of peace. The skillful desig- nation of the target also requires much practice. The firing may be by volley or at will, the former being advantageous when the range has been de- termined and the ground is suitable for observa- tion of th» fire, but in general is merely a drill- ground exercise of little practical use. The con- duct of the fire and all fire control is in the hands of the company and subordinate commanders, and one of the most difficult duties of these offi- cers is the observation of the effects of the fire. These are the generally accepted principles of infantry tactics, but in the different States of Europe there are still considerable variations. The fighting front of a battalion, for example, varies from 200 yards in the Italian Army to 400 in the French, and the latter has practically abolished the supports for the firing line. In France and Russia fire is opened at great ranges, over 1000 yards; all the nations except Ger- many lay great stress on volley firing. Again, in France (and in the United States, as set forth in Wagner's Tactics <md Orgntii::nfion, New York, 1895, ofl^cially approved), great attention is given to successive regular lines of attack, the first to introduce the action, the second to carry it out, and the third as a reserve: an indication of a love for theoretical forms, types, and sys- tems in matters that are too elusive for such treatment, and which experience on the battle- field has shown to be very different in practice. TACTICS OF CAVALRY. The prominent characteristic of cavalry is rapidity of- movement, and its greatest duty is the service of security and information: a cavalry which is superior to the enemy's in screening its own army and clearing up that of its adversary will more than pay for itself. Its duty next in importance is pursuit, as it alone is capable