Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 18.djvu/919

* TACONIC MOUNTAINS. 805 TACTICS. ing a small area in Massachusetts and Vermont (Map: Massaoluisetts, A3). It extcmls from the Highlands cast of the Hudson in a nortli-north- east direction, becoming gradually higher as it enters the northwestern corner of ^lassachusetls, and passes into southwestern Vermont, where it connects with the Green Mountains. Its higliest peaks are Mount Equinox in Vermont, 381G feet, and Gre.ylock in Massachusetts, 3535 feet. It consists chiefly of metamorphosed Cambrian and Silurian rocks to which it has given the name Taconic System (q.v,). TACONIC SYSTEM. A name applied by Emmons in 1S42 to a series of rocks found in eastern New York, western ]Massachusetts, and Vermont; and considered by him to be of pre- Potsdam age because of their metamorphosed character and the supposed absence of fossils. It has been suggested by some that the term Taconic should be substituted for Cambrian. Consult : Emmons, Geology of Neio York, part ii. (Albany, 1842); Dana, "A Brief History of Taconic Ideas," in American Journal of Science, third series, vol. xx.xvi. (New Haven). TACTICS (from Gk. toktikos, Inhtikos, relat- ing to arrangement, especially in war, from TaKTbs, taktos. arranged, from rda-aeiv, lassein, to arrange). Military. The art of conducting and arranging troops on the battlefield, or in its immediate vicinity. Strategj^ (<l-v. ) strives to make all the conditions for the coming battle favorable, while tactics endeavors to realize what strategy has prepared for. The same principles apply in both, but tactics is more dependent on actual practice, while strategy is more of an art, derived from study, reflection, and genius. Tactics not only demands from the individual officer understanding, comprehension, and genius, but in addition the masters of the art must be men of iron constitution and iron will. War alone can develop great soldiers — they are born, not made. But even they need preparation, edu- cation, and training — not to acquire theoretical knowledge, but to learn how to handle the tools of their art. Moreover, the great leaders need assistants, and these can be developed from the men of average ability, by the careful study of the use of the tools required, and practice with them and by the lessons of military history, bear- ing in mind that every case arising in war is an exception, and will never arise again, and not a general rule which may be used as a model. TACTICS OF INFANTRY. Infantry, except during a single period, name- ly, the Era of Knights or the Age of Chivalry, has always been the principal arm, that is to say numerically the strongest, and in its action the most decisive, and ever since the introduction of firearms the infantry has been gaining in impor- tance. It is the only arm which can act inde- pendenlhj, that is without the assistance of the other arms, under all conditions of ground, weather, and other circumstances, in attack or defense, while in motion or when at rest, in closed or open order, with fire action or shock action; it can operate on all kinds of ground: it is more independent of circumstances than the other arms: in it movement and effective firing may be combined to a far greater ex- tent than in the other arms ; it can come into action more easily and readily; it is equally efTective in attack and defense: it is more easily and cheaply equipped and maintained than the other arms; and it can be more quickly made ellicient. But it is limited in its rate of movement, hence the advantage of eond)ining cavalry with it; and in the range of its ell'ective action, hence the advantage of c(inil)ining artillery with it for battle, and cavalry for recoiuiaissance. Infantry holds its high position mainly on ac- count of its great fire-action combined with its capacity to utilize fully the configuration of the ground. The fire of the present breech-loading rifle be- gins to make itself felt at '.2500 yards, but does not become ellective as aimed fire vnitil about 1000 yards from the enemy; at 500 yards it is decisive, and at 300 practically annihilating. Constant improvement gradually increases these distances, and in the Boer War it was noticed that the British attack usuallv came to a stand- still at 900 yards. The perfection of firearms and the more ex- tended utilization of the configuration of the ground have greatly increased the power and sig- nificance of fire-action. The introduction of an automatic firearm is now only a question of a comparatively short time, and this will still further increase fire efTect. The bayonet attack, as an independent act, has ceased to exist; it can no longer overcome fire-action, but can only win the results of previous fire-action. The latter takes by far the longer time and makes the high- est demands on the strength and endurance of the troops; moreover, its annihilating efi'cct pun- ishes promptly anj- rash resort to the bayonet. Nevertheless the necessity for the bayonet re- mains; not indeed in hand to hand confiict, but as a threatening measure in the assault of a po- sition, and because of the confidence it inspires and the power of the initiative which it confers. According to the great German t^ictieian Meckel, "The laurel of victory still hangs on the point of the bayonet." The power of infantry fire necessitates cover, and the utilization of the natural configuration of the ground to secure this has acquired vital im- portance. The crossing of open spaces is avoided as much as possible, or postponed to decisive moments; hence, the battle usually crystallizes around woods, villages, and groups of buildings. But in broad open fields, as in the United States, or where troops are opposed to eacli other in strong natural or artificial positions for a consid- erable time, artificial cover must be obtained, consequently intrenehment is resorted to, and an intrenching tool has become a necessary part of the soldier's equipment. The formations in which infantry moves and fights are not the result of haphazard theory, but have grown out of the conditions of warfare, and their importance is attested by the fact that, in spite of the improvement in firearms, the losses in battle have become gradually smaller. Infantry can fight only when the distance from the enemy, or the available natural or artificial cover, permits it to fire, and efTective fire can only be obtained when the soldier has room to use his arm freely, consequently this arm fights in open or dispersed order, the closed order being used only for troops in rear of the firing line. The greatest difficulty in leading infantry is the loss of control liy the officers due to this dis- persed order, and this can only be overcome by