Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 17.djvu/844

* SELEUCIDJE. 766 tie and seized tlie whole kinydom, for which, however, he was forced to fight with Philip, and Antioehus XI. Epiphancs (q.v.), the .younger brother of Seleueus, and Demetrius III. Euca;rus (94-88), a third brother of Seleueus, vlio, with Philip, next claimed the sovereignty, which was taken from them by Tigranes (83-(iO), King of Armenia, at the solicitation of the Syrians; Antioehus XII. Dionysus (q.v.), a fourth brother of Seleueus, and Antioehus Xlll. Asiatieus (69- 65), who came into conflict with the Romans, and wasdeprivedof his possessions, which were convert- ed into a lionian province by Pompey in D.c. 64. SELEtJ'CTTS. Sec Seleucid.e. SELF (AS. self, seolf, Goth, silba, OHG., Ger. selb, self; perhaps connected with Ir. selb, pos- session). In psychology, a term synonymous with the 'conscious individual:' i.e. a self is a mind plus a body. It covers the whole range of consciousness, and is completed onlj' in the course of the individual's existence. It is conceivable that a self should exist without self-conscious- ness or a consciousness of self. The self is the organism — mind and body — considered structur- ally; consciousness of self is a function per- formed by those conscious processes which refer to or ideate the self. Self-consciousness, then, is set over against consciousness of external reality, of things which lie outside the individual. The two consciousnesses are composed of similar pro- cesses, but have entirely different references. Self may also mean the mental ego alone. Even in the narrower sense, a 'self or a 'mind' im- plies more than a collection of mental pro- cesses taken at haphazard. It implies the inter- relations which always subsist among the pro- cesses of a given individual. It is often said that 'no two people are alike.' and this is undoubtedly true, quite apart from bodily differences. The dissimilarities which inhere in selves or minds arc to be referred to unlikenesses of mental con- stitution (q.v.), i.e. to differences in memory- type, in habitual modes of association, in tem- perament, in liability to emotional excitement, in differences in the unitariness of one's experi- ences, in rash impulsiveness or balanced sanity, in tendency to criminal action or to religious fervor, and so on. All these things are in- dicative of ultimate variations in mental ten- dency. They form the basis for the heterogene- ity of society. When an individual's act exhibits his pecu- liar mental constitution we say that the act is 'characteristic' that 'it is just like him.' mean- ing that in the action the individual has ex- pressed his 'self-hood,' that the act was not deter- mined by a chance impulse, but that it repre- sented a long line of 'tendency' (q.v.). Consult authorities under Self-Coxsciousness. SELF-CONSCIOTJSNESS. Self-conscious- ness or 'consciousness of self may be either a, perception or idea or it may be a concept. When one thinks of one's existence as an individual (a certain mind and a certain body) one has an 'idea of self.' If self is considered in the ab- stract, without any personal reference — not 'my- self,' or 'himself,' or 'herself,' simply a 'self — it becomes a concept : psychology is interested in such a concept only in so far "as it is interested in concepts in general, i.e. in seeking to deter- mine the mental processes that underlie their formation. (See Concept.) It has more to in- SELF-DEFENSE. vestigate in the perception or idea of self. Psy- chology has to ask ( 1 ) what jjrocesses enter in- to the formation of the perception or idea, and (2) how the self comes to be perceived or ide- ated. These questions are most easily answered by saying that the self is a simple, unitary, ac- tive "principle' or 'thing' which dwells witliin the body and directs it. But since no such "princi- ple' or 'thing' can be found when the mind is looked at critically, we must infer that this no- tion of self is got by putting a concrete though fantastic filling into the abstract conceptual self. If we scrutinize the self-idea for its real 'em- pirical' filling, we find that its contents vary from day to day, from minute to minute. Xow it is 'm3'self' as performing my part in a given situation, social, professional, domestic, reli- gious; now it is 'mj-self carrying certain respon- sibilities, owing certain obligations, sustaining certain relations with others, possessing proper- ty, family, friends. But in all this shifting of the self-idea there are certain constant elements which support the whole. The most prominent of these are one's name, the words 'I' and 'my;' visual and tactual perceptions of the body; numerous sensations of internal move- ments; a feeling of 'self-complacency;' 'self- satisfaction:' and a mass of relatively stable or- ganic sensations which are not ordinarilj' ana- r3-zed and referred to their various points of origin, but come to consciousness "in the lump.' The constancy and stability of all these things depend upon bodily and mental constitution (see Mental Constitutio>- and Self), which means in every individual a tendency to appear, to feel, and to act in a definite and permanent manner. The origin of the idea of self is partly social and partly individual. Every person is an ob- ject to other persons. He is treated as a perma- nent being, as a centre of activity and as a unit in the community. In addition to this, his owti experience is more or less coherent, more or less of a whole, and his conscious actions lead him to consider himself as an originator in the external world of things. See Will and Apperception. Consult: Wundt, Pht/siologische Psi/chologie (Leipzig, 1893); Ribot. Diseases of Memory (Eng. trans., New York, I88"2) ; .Tames. Prinei- ples of Psychology (ib., 1890) ; Kuelpe, Outlines of Psychology, trans, (ib., 189.5) : Titehener. Out- line of Psychology (ib., 1890) ; Stout, Mriiiiiril of Psychology (ib., 1899) ; Royce, Psychology (ib., 1903). SELF-DEFENSE. In law, the defense of one's person or property from threatened vio- lence or injury by the exercise of force. Self- defense is one of the forms of remedy by self- help (q.v.). In general one may defend himself from assault or unlawful attack by the use of force provided he iise no more force than is nec- essary to accomplish that result, and his act will give rise to no civil or criminal liability. If he use more force than is necessary to reiiel the at- tack, he will be liable both civilly and criminally for assault. Under these conditions both the as- sailant and the person assailed may be guilty of assault. The rule that, in the exercise of his right of self-defense, one may meet force with force is subject to one other important qualifica- tion. He may not carry his forcible resist- ance to the point of taking life when he may safely retreat from his assailant. Whenever