Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 16.djvu/853

* KECLtTSE. ro3 RECOGNIZANCE. strict retirement. To avoid the danger of tlie practice ministering to mere self-will or to fanatical and unbalanced austerity, it was strict- ly regulated from the middle of the seventh century; and the recluse, who must be a person of tried virtue, was with due solemnity locked up in the presence of the abbot or the bishop, who placed his seal upon the door, not to be re- moved without the authority of the bishop him- self. Xuns also were found to practice the same voluntary seclusion, especially under the rules of the Benedictine. Franciscan, and Cistercian Orders. Consult: Paw, Les recluseries (Lyons, 1875) ; Hauber, Lebeti und M'irken der Einge- schlossenen ( SchafThausen, 1844). RECOGNITION (Lat. recognitio, from recog- noscere. to know again, from re-, back again, anew + cognoscere, from eo-, together -f gtios^ cere, to know). An object is said to be 'recog- nized' when it appears as familiar. Thus one recognizes an acquaintance or a locality that has been visited before. Recognition stands mid- way between the feeling of strangeness or nov- elty, on the one hand, and the affective indif- ference which characterizes the cognition of a well-worn environment, on the other. Associa- tions apart, unknown objects tend to arouse a feeling of uneasiness, or even of alarm ; very familiar objects, such as one's tools, or break- fast table or writing desk, tend to become in- different, taken for granted, while objects which are encountered occasionally produce a mildly pleasant mood which forms the core of recog- nition. There is a fourth stage in the afl'ective reaction which appears in tedium or ennui. At this stage active interest has gone beyond its indifference point and has passed into monotony. One is said to feel boied, to be tired of one's surroundings, etc. It is not always easy to discriminate between recognition and cognition. In fact, the terms have often been used indiscriminately. But it it Ijctter to reserve the word cognition for the identification of well-known or commonplace ob- jects which do not arouse the recognitive mood, or again, of objects whose kind is well known, although the individual perceived may be un- known. Recognition is closely related to memory (q.v. ). In memory, it is a recollection that ap- pears familiar. The remembrance of a debate in which one took part, or of a fire witnessed last week, bears the mark of familiarity in the sense that it comes before one as a part of past experience. In recognition, it is a present per- ception — the object before one — that is famil- iar. The recognition need not refer explicitly to the past: the memory always does. There are two forms of recognition: direct and indirect. ( I ) In direct recognition there arises at once a belief that the object perceived is known. This belief appears under two forms. Either it takes the general form, 'this object is familiar,' or some specific form, such as, 'this object is mv neighbor's dog. Rover.' In the first case there ' is bare familiarity ; in the second case there is familiarity plus additional knowl- edge of the object as a particular object. (2) In its indirect form, recognition is brought about mediately: i.e. an object is recognized by means of its environment, by reason of the surround- ings in which it is set. This takes place when the object itself fails to arouse the mood of familiarity and is known only through attendant circumstances either past or present. Recognition has performed a very important biological function in the history of the race. It is one of the means by which the organism adapts itself to its environment. Like many of the more important emotions — fear, anger, sym- pathy — it is deeply rooted in instinct. The ani- mal learns to trust that which is familiar, that which has stood the test of acquaintance, and to show distrust in the face of the novel and un- tried. Thus have developed, side by side, a pleasant aggressive mood of confidence in pres- ence of the known and an unpleasant shrinking mood of diffidence and dislike in presence of the unknown. The refined and modified successors of these instinctive attitudes persist in our moods of familiarity and unfamiliarity. BiBLiOGEAPHT. HoefTdiug, Outlines of Psy- chology (Xew York, 1891); Wolfe, in Philo- sophische Studien, vol. iii. (Leipzig, 1886) ; Lehmann, id., vols, v., vii. (ib.. 1889; 1892); Hoeffding, id., viii. (ib., 1893); Kiilpe, Out- lines of Psychology (New York, 1895) ; Ward, Mind, N. S., ii., iii. (London, 1893-94); Titche- ner. Outline of Psychology (Xew York, 1899) ; Spencer, Principles of Psychology (New York, 1890) ; Sully. Outlines of Psychology (Xew York. 1891 ). For recognition as an experimental method, see IIemort. RECOGNITION MARKS. The bars and stripes of various animals which Wallace thinks serve for recognition by animals of their own species. He claims that color for recognition is "a totally distinct category, to some extent an- tagonistic or complementary" to protective col- oration (q.v.). Recognition colors and markings are prevalent among butterflies and moths, and among them "its chief function may have been to secure the pairing together of individuals of the same species." Recognition marks during flight are very important for all birds which congre- gate in flocks or which migrate together; and they usually consist of well-contrasted markings on the wings and tail. These markings occur in pigeons, hawks, finches, warblers, ducks, etc.. and are illustrated graphically in Bird Lore, vol. iii. (Xew York, 1901). Recognition marks occur in many mammals, such as the zebra, many ante- lopes, gazelles, and allied African forms, includ- ing the eland, koodoo, etc. On the other hand, objectors assert that such .stripes and spots are for protection, i.e. conceal- ment (see Protective Color.tion), and that they represent "spots or streaks of sunlight pass- ing through foliage or reflected from leaves." Consult: Wallace, Daru-inisni (l<:ew York, 1889) ; Pocock. "Antelopes and Their Recognition Marks," in Xature, vol. Ixii. (London, 1900). RECOGNIZANCE, ri-kog'ni-zans or ri-kon^- Zfzns (JIL. recognosccntia. from I^a.t. recognoscere, to know again). An obligation entered into by a person with a court of record, whereby he binds himself under a penalty to do or not to do a particular thing required of him by the court, and which is made a part of the record. Re- cognizances differ but little in form from ordi- narv bonds, except that they need not be executed with the same formality, as they are entered into before the court, and that they are commonly given by persons under a criminal charge. In many jurisdictions recognizances need not be