Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 12.djvu/462

* LOGIC. 410 LOGIC. word. Judgment is possible only when a number of such distinct ideas are retained and easily called into consciousness" (English translalioni . But bigwart acknowledges that "some thought is already involved in the ])roce3s by whioh these ideas arc formed. " He excludes the consi<lcration of such thought from logic simply because it "precedes conscious and intentional thought." The difference then between the view advocated by Sigwart and that presented above docs not con- cern the facts, but it concerns the definition and scope of logic. If logic is the science of the con- ditions of all correct thinking, then judgments whose predicates have no names must be included in its treatment. Otherwise logic uuist be de- iincd as the science of the conditions of correct intentional thought; and such a definition un- warrantably restricts the meaning of a word that for ages has had a wider denotation. Logic then should treat of the processes by which a perce|)t is recognized as having a qualifying feature even though the thinker has as yet no names at his disposal. Predicate ideas are, in one sense, always gen- eral : in another sense they may be singular. It is at first ]ierl>aps only as one percept is com- pared with another that a feature is recognized in either as qualifying it. A common feature, recognized as qualifying several percepts, is a general idea, and when it is named the tervn used to designate it is called a general term. But a feature may be i)eeuliar to one object, which at various times presents itself to observation, and may be recognized as qualifying the object each time it appears. In such a ease the feature, recognized as characterizing the percejit every time it appears is common to the various ap- pearances of the percept, but peculiar to the percept. Whether, therefore, the idea of that feature be considered general or singular de- pends U[>on the point of view. Again, any feature which experience presents as a peculiar attribute of an object of perception may appear as a common attribute of various imaginary objects, and in lliis way be a general idea. In a similar manner, upon the point of view depends the es- sential or accidental character of an attribute of an object. Every term representing a com- plex of many qualities or attributes may be used for certain of them as essential to the judg- ment in which the term is employed, while others are disregarded, and accordingly, for that use. are merely accidents or chance phenomena. The accidental character is thus not inherent in the particular quality, but is determined by the selective nature of thought, and exists only for the particular usage or judgment. Every general idea is technically a concept, and may be simple or complex ; i.e. it may or may not be incapable of analysis. Thus intensity of a color sensation is unanalyzable. while visi- bility, as qualifying an object, is analyzable into the various attributes of visual sensations. If an object is visible, it is colored or bright, and besides it has an intensity, a duration, and a spatial extension of these sensations. Thus visi- bility is analyzable; intensity, one of the results of the analysis, as yet has not been analyzed. The results of an analysis of a concept are col- lectively called its connotation (q.v.), and are severally called its marks; the objects which such a concept qualifies are its denotation (q.v, 1, The statement of the connotation of a term is called definition (q.v,) ; a systematic statement of it-- denotation is called division (q,v,). In gener;il but not with a mathematioal accuracy, dcnola lion and connotation vary inversely; the larger the number of marks in a concept, the fewer will in all probability be the number of real objecl- which arc qualified by the concept, Traditioiuil logic has distinguished between concrete and :il straet terms. A term is concrete when it nam a total percept or image with its full coniph nient of features; it is abstract if it names only certain of these features. The test of a full coui- plement of features is the ability of these fea- tui'cs to function as percept or image without need of supplementation by further features. Thus animal is the name of various percepts or images; the term is therefore concrete, Ani- niality is the name of a certain feature or com- plex of features characterizing those pereejjts ( r images, but the feature or cuniplex of featui. known as animality is xmable to function in consciousness as a percept or image; heiicr animality is an abstract term. It will be noticvi that while animal is a name applied to eomplcli' percepts or images, it is thus applicable only because of the attribute of animality which tbiy possess. It names, or toclinically it denotes. the percepts or images; it makes reference to, "v technically it connotes, the attribute of aiii mality. by virtue of the possession of which tin- percepts or images have a right to be denoted by the term. Hence, contrary to the tradition;: I opinion, concrete terms are not names of Cdi ccpts at all; they are names of pereejits o, images, while at the same time they usually coii- note concepts. .Sonic concrete terms arc said 1" be non-connotative ; i.e. they do not specifically refer to any definite concept which eharaeterizcs the objects they name. Proper names, strictly so called, -are to all intent~s and purposes non- connotative. Thus Saint Louis is a name given to a city which is identifiable by various charac- teristics, not one of which is referred to directly by the name it bears and not one of which is singled out for purposes of identification, Many so-called proper names are not absolutely 'proper' in that they indicate sex or family relationsliips or nationality or other traits; hence they are to a certain e.vtcnt connotative. This distinction between connotative and non-connotative term* is really a matter of language, not of logic; f'l although the name Saint Louis does not refer explicitly to any mark possessed by the object it denotes, no thinker can employ the term without thinking that object as characterized by some mark. In his thought it is a city, situated on the ^Mississippi, etc. If not characterized in some way, it is not an object of thought at all, .gain, traditional logic divides terms into positive and negative. Corresponding to this distinction in terms, there is in consciousness a two-fold charac- ter belonging to every concept, .s we have seen, a concept is obtained by analysis of a iierocpt. Analysis always inAolvcs distinct ion of one ele- ment of a complex from another, and "distinction is negation" (Spinoza), To distinguish one thing from another is to recognize that it is what the other is not. Concepts thus owe their origin to a primitive negative aspect in the original judg- ment that breaks a percept up into its constit- uents. The result of such an analyzing judgment' is a complex of differentiated perpetual features or concepts. Now a concept in proportion as