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LEGION OF HONOR. LEGION OF HONOR. A French order of merit founded by Napoleon in 1802 and organized two years later. The distinction was conferred for meritorious conduct in military or civil life. The order comprised in the beginning 3605 chevaliers, 450 officers, 300 commanders, 105 grand officers, and a grand master, the last office being vested in Napoleon himself. All members at their initiation were required to pledge their support to the defense of the State and of the liberties achieved by the Revolution. The order experienced many alterations with the successive changes of dynasties in France. Its present constitution dates from the year 1872, when it was reorganized into five classes—chevaliers, officers, commanders, grand officers, and grand crosses. Stipends ranging from 250 francs for a chevalier to 3000 francs in the case of a grand cross are attached to these dignities. In 1892 the order numbered 43,851 members of all classes, and by law of 1897 the maximum number of additional crosses to be distributed was fixed at 14,320. The emblem of the order is a five-rayed star of white enamel edged with gold, bearing on its obverse the image of the Republic with the inscription Republique Française, and on the reverse two flags with the motto Honneur et Patrie. It is surmounted by a wreath of oak and laurel and is suspended from a red ribbon. Originally the cross bore, instead of the emblem of the Republic, the portrait of Napoleon, and was surmounted by an Imperial crown. The order is also conferred on foreigners, and in some cases upon women.

 LEGISLATION. The creation, alteration, or repeal of law, by the act of the sovereign. In primitive society legislation as a source of law had little or no place, custom and usage supplying whatever rules were found to be necessary for the regulation of the common affairs of the community. In such a society the deficiencies of customary law were often supplied by commands issued by the King or chief, sometimes with the assent of his warriors or nobles. In some communities this power became vested in a special class of learned persons, as, for example, the Druids in Britain and the Brehons in Ireland. The disinclination to innovate upon the customary law, however, and the comparatively few legislative needs of a primitive society made the enactment of new law a rare occurrence. It is doubtful if the great ancient codes contained much new law, for it would have been a rash act for a lawgiver to presume to innovate upon the immemorial customs of the race. But with the growth of a more highly developed society and the advance of civilization new sources of law made their appearance. Legislation, says Sir Henry Maine, is one of the three agencies by which law is brought into harmony with society, the other two being legal fiction and equity. Bentham, however, using the term in a wider sense, includes both legal fiction and equity under the head of legislation, on the ground that all three processes involve the making of new law, the difference being only one of method. The term is more commonly employed in the special sense of the enactment or amendment of law by the direct action of the sovereign, or of a special organ of the State to which the legislative power is committed. As thus employed, it excludes the process of adjudication, which is, however disguised, one of the most prolific

sources of law. Indeed, the complete separation of the two processes is a device of modern society, legislative and judicial functions not being distinguished in the earlier stages of legal development.

Legislation played an important rôle in the legal development of the Greek republics of antiquity, especially in the popular assemblies of Athens and Sparta, but it attained its highest development in the republican era of Rome. Here its chief organs were the comitia, or popular assembly of free citizens, and the Senate, whose decrees (senatus consulta) have been the model of succeeding ages. During the Imperial period the legislative function gradually passed out of the hands of the Senate, into those of the Emperor, whose judgments and decrees (known variously as constitutions, decrees, rescripts, and mandates) had the force of law without further sanction. The responses of the jurists (responsa prudentum), to whom the actual decision of doubtful cases was referred, likewise derived their authority from their confirmation by the Emperor.

During the mediaeval period legislation throughout Europe was a function of the prince, sometimes assisted by a council, but never controlled by it. Toward the close of the Middle Ages, however, the rise of Parliament in England led to the withdrawal of a considerable part of the legislative power hitherto exercised by the King, and its assumption by Parliament. (See .) Elsewhere this power was retained by the princes until the nineteenth century, during the course of which period representative legislative bodies were provided in all those countries which established constitutional systems of government. According to the modern idea of the term, legislation has reference to the formal enactments of those representative bodies especially created for purposes of law-making. But besides the body of legislation emanating from the legislatures there is another important body of law peculiar to modern States which goes by the name of organic or fundamental legislation, and is embodied in the various constitutions of government. This form of legislation differs from the preceding class both as to source and status. In the first place, it emanates usually from constituent assemblies, or, as they are popularly called in America, constitutional conventions; and, secondly, it takes precedence in authority over the body of law which emanates from the legislatures. There is still a third form of law-making commonly known as direct legislation, which results from the application of the principle of the (q.v.). According to this method legislative projects are initiated by the legislature or by popular petition and submitted directly to the electorate for its approval or disapproval, the validity of the statute being conditioned upon its acceptance by a majority of the voters at the polls. This method of legislation is resorted to quite generally in Switzerland, both in the Federal and cantonal governments, as well as in many of the American States. Recently constitutional amendments have been submitted in several States of the Union for the establishment of a system of popular initiative in legislation, such as exists in Switzerland. There are undoubtedly signs of a growing tendency in the United States to accord a more general 