Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 11.djvu/343

* JUDGES OF ISRAEL. 313 JUDGMENT. another. Certain recollections of them survived to later times, and, combined with legends, folk- lore, and myth, gradually took shape as a con- tinuous narrative. The verb underlying the word 'judge' signifies also 'to vindicate,' and hence they may be called "deliverers,' which conveys a more accurate idea of their real position. Tribal his- tory among the Hebrews, as among Arabs, is largely taken up with disputes and quarrels among clans, with petty wars, with warding off attacks, or with making sallies upon other clans. Of the si.xteen names included by tradition under the appellation 'judges,' nine are heroes belong- ing to one clan or the other, of whom some mighty deeds are told; three (Ibzan, Elon. and Abdon) represent clans rather than individuals; one (De- borah ) is a prophetess who by her influence brought about a great combination of clans for the attack upon a common enemy ; another ( Sam- son) is a semi-mythieal personage, totally differ- ent in chaiacter from the other judges: a third (Eli) is essentially a priest; while Samuel is an influential 'seer.' It will be seen from this how confusing it is to group these names together, and regard them as performing the same functions. According to tradition, the period covered by the 'judges' is 400 years. As a matter of fact, from the death of iloses to the days of Saul is not more than 250 j-ears, and perhaps even somewhat less. See .Judges, Book of, and the articles on individual judges. JUDGMENT (OF., Fr. jugetnent, from ML. judicameiituiii, judgment, from Lat. judicare, to judge, from judex, judge, from jus, right, law + dicere. to say) (in logic). The act of distin- guishing an element within the unity of an object of thouglit. and of recognizing the function of that element as giving character to that object. In the above definition the term 'act' means func- tion, without any metaphysical connotation, and the term 'object of thought' is not used to exclude objects of perception or of emotion. We may think about what we perceive or about what we feel. When we thus think about our perceptions or our emotions they become objects of thought, while they may still remain objects of perception or of emotion. We may thus pass judgment upon any objects whatever, objects perceived, remembered, imagined, feared, hoped for, willed, etc. ; and the element distinguished within the iniity of such an object may be of any descrip- tion whatever, a sense-quality, a sense-intensity, an affective tone, or what not. Traditional 'logic distinguishes within the judgment three parts — subject, predicate, and copula. Not all of these, however, are really parts of a judg- ment. The predicate is the element within the unity of the object of thought or the judgment, recognized as giving character to the object of thought. Thus, in the judgment "Sugar is sweet," sweetness forms the predicate of the judgment. What the subject of a judgment is has been a moot question. Traditional logic gives only a for- mal definition, saying that it is that of which the predicate is asserted. But the question arises, Of what is the predicate asserted? In the judg- ment 'man is an animal.' there would be no ques- tion, perhaps, that the subject is the complex object of thought called man. which an element, viz. animality, y-ithin the complex, is recognized as qualifjMng. But how about such a judgment as is expressed by saying. The house I saw yes- terday was burned down this morning*? Tradi- VOL. XI.— Jl. tional logic would answer by saying that the sub- ject in this case is completely expressed in the phrase "the house I saw yesterday.' If this is true, then the subject in this judgment does not perform the same logical function as was per- formed by the subject in the judgment last dis- cussed. The subject here would not be the com- plex object of thought which an element within the complex is recognized as qualifying. It would be a complex which an element outside of the complex is recognized as qualifying. Total com- bustion this morning is not a feature of the complex object of thought which is adequately expressed by the phrase "the house I .saw yester- day.' It is a feature of the object of thought adequately expressed by the phiase 'the house which I saw yesterday and which burned down this morning.' Therefore, if the subject performs the same function in this judgment as in the judgment, 'ilan is an animal,' then the subject is the total object of thought which is expressed by the phrase given in the last sentence. This view of the case reduces all judgments, so far as con- cerns the relation between subject and predi- cate, to one type which since Kant's day has been called analytical. (See A^jalytic .Juug- siEXT.) It does not deny the synthetical char- acter of thought in judgment, but holds that the synthesis is all represented in the logi- cal subject, while the analysis is represented, at least in part, in the logical predicate. Ac- cording to this view, therefore, all judgments may be expressed in the following formula : A certain object of thought, which may be identified by a certain characteristic or complex of charac- teristics, is further qualified by the mark or marks signalized in the predicate. According to another interpretation of the function of the subject in such judgments, the subject is not the total complex within which the predicate is an element, but it is an object of thought of smaller connotation (q.v. ), which the predicate ex- tends by adding to its content. According to this view, some judgments may be expressed in the following formula : A certain object of thought which is expressed by a certain term is in synthesis with another object of thought expressed by another term. Tliis view makes the relation between subject and predicate one of synthesis, and therefore classifies all judg- ments of this sort as synthetical. If concepts were fixed and immutable things, as many thinkers regiird them, then the latter view alone would be tenable. But concepts are constantly changing, hence it is perfectly permissible to maintain as the former view does that in what are called synthetical judgments the predicate redefines and requalifies the subject. In other words, 'the syn- thetical judgment, a posteriori,' is a recognition of a modification of the object of thought. The judgment does not give to the subject new fea- tures, but recognizes them as having already appeared in the subject, and as therefore necessi- tating a new analysis. This is true even of Kant's 'a priori synthetical judgments.' i.e. judg- ments which, it is alleged, combine different con- ceptions independently of experience. It is a misrepresentation to say that the combination is independent of experience. Peripherally origi- nated experience ( =: experience due to sense- stimuli acting upon the outer and not the brain end of sensoi-y nerves) may indeed have never presented certain elements in certain combina-