Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 10.djvu/736

* INSANITY. 650 INSANITY. persons a8 such, cliielly for the following jxir- poses: (1) To iisecrUiiii tlioir rospon.sihility for crime; (2) to ascertnin their eii]mcit.v to make contracts; (3) to ascertain their liability for their torts; (4) to ascertain their capacity to make wills. (1) liE.si"ON.siitiLnv FOR {'itiMK. The insanity of one charged with criine may |ireclmle the exist- ence of the criminal intent which is an essential element of the crime. W lic-n. therefore, the plea of insanity is set np on liclialf of one charju'cd with crime the qiiestiun raised is. Was the accused capable of forminj; a criminal intent at the time when he committed the act? The law on this subject was first fully investifjated. and a legal test of insanity in crimin:il cases adopted. in Si'Naghton's case by the Knglish House of Lords in 1S4.'}. M'Xajrhtnn. having killed an- other while imder the inlluence of an insane de- lusion, was charged with murder and certain questions growing out of the case were put to the judges of the House of Lor<ls. They an- swered in substance that mere insanity was not a defense: that to establish want of criminal responsibility it nuist bo jiroved that the party accused was laboring under such defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; that an insane delusion would not establish want of responsibility imlcss the delusion if true would justify the defendant in doing the act with which he is charged. Thus, one who killed another under an insane delusion that the other was threatening his life under circumstances of immediate danger to himself is not criminally responsible for the homieide; but an insane de- hision that another was slandering the defendant would not excuse him for killing or even assault- ing the supposed slanderer, assuming always that in other particulars the di'fendant knew the na- ture and (luality of his act. M'Xaghton's case still represents the law in England, and its rules have been adopted by the court.s of most of the United States. The elTect of M'Xaghton's case is to hold to full legal responsibility one who commits an otTense under the inlluence of an insane, irresis- tible impulse, if he knew at the time the nature and character of his act. And this is generally the law. although it is conceded that there can he no criminal act without a free agent, and there may l>e in a given case the strongest evidence of the existence of such an impulse. The courts of n few States, however, relying on the assertion of medical experts that such a form of insanity does exist, recognize such a plea as a good ground of defense, but hedge about their ruling with the most stringent requirements as to proof of such mental defect. Idiocy or iml)ecility is also a defense to crime. The test adopted, viz. that one must have as much mental capacity as a child fourteen years old in order to be convicted of crime, is not very satisfactory, but is prohahly the best po.ssible. .'^o-ealled moral insanity and emotional insanity have never lieen recognized by the courts as a legal defense to crime. One charged with a crime is presumed to be sane, and the prosecution is not in the first in- stance required to introduce evidence of sanity of the defendant. Upon the defendant's ofTering evi- dence to prove his insanity the burden of proving sanity is thrown upon the prosecution. Theoreti- cally, since the cfTect of insanity is to .show absence of criminal intent, the prosecution should be required to prove sanity beyond a rca.sunablu doubt in order to establish criminal intent. In a few States Uiis is the rule. In the majority, however, the defendant is required to prove his in.sanity by the preponderance of evidence, and in one or two to prove his insanity beyond a rea.sonable doubt. Jn.sanity may also Iw a bar to the trial or punisbmeiit of (Uie charged with a crime. The test of insanity in the one case is the defendant's ability to vmderstand the na- ture of the ch.irge and of the trial, and in the other the nature and pur])ose of the punislnnent. (2) Cap.city to Co.ntk.vct. The contracts of a lunatic, that is one for whom a comniittee has been appointed, are void, and no rights or liabilities are acquired under them either by the lunatic or the person dealing with him. The contracts of one who is insane, but who has not been judicially declared to he a lunatic by the appiiinlment of a committee for the ix'rsun or property, arc in general voidable, i.e. they stand as valid luitil he or his legal representative set them aside. Komierly it was held that the law would not allow one to plead his own insanity in order to avoid his contracts, since he would by so doing stultify himself. This rule no longer obtains. If the insanity is of a character sudi as to prevent ;in insane person from understand- ing and reasoning properly with referenie to the contract and its terms, and the insanity is known til the jx'rson dealing with him, then the contrait may Ih- avoided at the option of the insane person or his legal representative. If. however, the person dealing with him does not know of the insanity, and he have nothing to put him on his guard, the weight of authority is that such a (ontract cannot be avoided unless the sane parly could 1)0 placed in statu quo. An insane person is absolutely liable for necessaries duly sup- plied to himself or his wife upon the theory of quasi-contracts (q.v.). Sec Xkce.ssariic.s. (.3) LiABii.iTV I'OR Torts. .lustice and jiuli lie policy require that insane persons should In- bound to pay from their property for damage caused by their torts to others, and it is gener ally the law that insane persons are liable for their torts. In the ease of malicious torts, as lil>els and slanders, insanity may render the mind incapable of entertaining malice, in which ease there is no liability, anil for the same reason insanity of a (lefend:int may be a ground for not awarding punitive or vindictive damages. See Tort: Damages, (4) Capacity to Make a Will. Insanity does not necessarily render one incapable of making a will. It is declared by the best judges that so high a degree of mental ability is not needed to make a will as is requisite to the formation of a valid contract. The criterion of testamentary capacity in this lespect. as stated by the Xew York Court of .Appeals in the cele- brated Parish will case (Dclafield -s. Parish. 2.5 Now York 0. S.^). has been generally accepted and acted on throughout the world. It is thai the testator must be capable of >inderstanding the nature of the business in which he is engaged, of summoning before his mind, without prompting, the property of which he wishes to dispose, ami the persons who are the natural objects of his bounty, and of retaining them in his mind n sufficient length of time to arrive at a rational conclusion. The two salient elements of this