Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 10.djvu/695

* INFANTBY. 609 INFANTRY. niatiuiis to meet concentrated onslaught. The looo'e formation, with intervals of a pace or more between files, was similar to the extended order of modern tactics, and in other features con- nected with the attack, support, reserves, etc., we have in our modern system quite closely fol- lowed llu'ir iileas, omitting the heavy lines. The front rank of the infantry was fre(|uentl}' armed willi >pears 21 to 24 feet in lengtli, or lances 18 feet in length; the piliim, an iron-])ointed spear weighing some 12 pounds, was thrown at close range, and this attack followed by a rush and njeli'e with the short, stout, two-edged sword. The introduction of gunpowder in the fourteenth tenlury and the invention of the lianil-gun dur- ing I lie fifteenth century contributed to hasten the downfall of feudalism by rendering the in- fantry' soldier equal to the armor-clad knight. 'I'o I'rince -Maurice of Nassau (1507-102.5) is attributed the sagacious plan of arming half of his infantry with firearms and improving the bntt-end of the arquebus, so that it could be handled more readily and placed against the chest. Nevertheless, still following the old fash- ions, he kept his infantry in ten ranks. Firearms in improved forms for the infantry gradually came into general use. but for defen- sive purposes more than halt of the infantry were still armed with the pike to keep olT the cavalry, the (irearm as yet not having the bayonet. In lO.'i.S. at Wittcnweiler. the musketeers of the Duke of Weimar were able to fire only seven times between noon and 8 P.M. The further use of firearms led to the gradual reduction of armor and depth of formations of the infantry. JMore radical changes were, however, made dur- ing the seventeenth century (1630) by Gus- tavtis .d(dphus. King of Sweden. Perhaps the iikinI vital reform instituted arose from greatly iniprnveil discipline and the improvement in the equipments, which aimed to lessen the weight of the nuisket an<l increase the efi'ectiveness of the infantry. The use of cartridges enabled a soldier to fire at least twice as rapidly as was possible when powder, primer, and bullets were carried in separate ])0uches. Gustavus .dolphu3 continuecl the heavy phalanx formation with some modification, his infantry forming si.x ranks dee]), and when under fire deployed to form three ranks, following the old Roman nu'tlKjii of the second line replacing the losses of the first line: the infantry were in line for- mations, subdivisions certain distances apart. The musketeers numbered nearly three-fourths of Gistavus Adolphus's infantry. The .Sw'edish (U'der of l)att!e was thus formed on the memorable fii'Id of laitzen (10.32). The Germans, in this battle, adhered to the heay and deep phalanx formation. Under Charles IT. (lOOO-S.")) the foot re;.'iments were armed either with pikes or match- Ini-ks <M- firelocks, and each soldier also carried a ■<vord: they were later equipjied with the hand- grenade, whence the name 'Grenadier Guards," the equipment being modernized while the name has been retained. Few tactical changes followed the death of Gustavvis .Adolphus, until Frederick the Great (1740 SO) revived interest both in arms and onjanization by many reforms and corrections of military errors. The infantry, his main strength and dependence, was formed in three ranks, en- abling every man to fire. The army was ar- ranged in two lines, omitting, however, all skir- mishers and reserves. The limited range of their firearms brought the troops into closer personal contact than occurs nowadays. The victories of Frederick the Great in the War of the Aus- trian Succession (1740-48) and the Seven Years' War (1750-03) placed Prussia preeminent among the military powers of Europe. The heavy for- mations so long continued, now gave way as cannon were brought into use and great masses of artillery concentrated to crush the enemy. The column formation, practically the same thing except that the lines were composed of two or throe files, with lessened front and greater num- ber of lines, continued down to very recent years; and to-day the formation in mass, either line or column, has been abandoned for the extended- order system. Infantry constitutes the principal tactical and administrative body of the army and the basic foimdation for the projHjrtion of all other arms. and it can be more rapidly trained and mobilized than either cavalry or artillery. It is in the infantry that the principle of expansion finds its widest application. In determining the organiza- tion of the line of the arm}' it is given the great- est preponderance. In the armies of Great Britain the proportion is: infantry. 141.002; all other arms, cavalry, artillery, engineers, etc.. 87,000; and in the Indian Army — infantry, 100, - 000; all other arms, 23.000. ' The proportion- ate loss of the several important arms of the service during the Franco-Prussian War was given, for the German Army, as: infantry, 17.0 per cent. ; cavalry. 6.3 per cent. ; artillery, G.o per cent. Infantry Battle Formations, Tactical dis- positions have materially changed from time to time as rified guns and breech-loaders have developed rapidity and precision of fire, while the fiatter trajectory of a projectile, moving ali7iost horizontally instead of with high curva- ture, increases the danger space to within 2000 yards' range. The decisive firing usually begins at about 000 yards. The plan now in general tise for infantry — alternate rushes by sections, platoons, or companies — has been found best adapted to attack, such rushes usiially being limited to fifty yards, but under war conditions governed by strength and accuracy of the enemy's lire and the cover furnished by the terrain, and exceeding this only when the ground offers more favorable position. The men between such rushes kneel, lie down, or get under cover of some suit- able object, this protection being considered of more importance than precise distance or regu- larity of alignment. This is the system termed 'extended order,' or perhaps better expressed as individual or dispersed order; it is a regulated dis<n'der. The term 'loose order' should not, however, be used, as leading to possible mis- construction : it merely means the no longer close form:ition, leaving to each soldier some latitude of action. Each man has intervals from his next file of 35 or 45 inches in single ranks, sttpporled by similar lines of supports and I'eserves. This system requires thorough discipline and alertness in observing surrounding conditions. The spaces between ranks and lines of supports are necessarily elastic, and permit of freer indi- vidual action, with (he least possible losses in advancing to the attack in face of a nnirderous fire from ihf repeating rifles. The zone of the