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* HEGEL. 716 HEGEL. ris, book ii. of Greater Logic (New York, 1S81) ; and portions of book i. of the Greater Logic by J. H. [Stirling in his Secret of Hegel (2d ed., Edinburgh, 1897). It is impossible in this article to give any detailed account of Hegel's system of philos- ophy. He called it the system of the Absolute Idea. The idea is, for him, the indissoluble unity of the universe, existing in the two polar distinctions of subject and object. This idea is absolute because all-inclusive. The method by which Hegel arrived at this result he called dia- lectic (Dialektik), and by this he meant the process of exhibiting the incomplete character of any conception except the all-inclusive concep- tion of the Absolute Idea. Thus in his Logik, which expounds the method, Hegel begins with the conception of Being (Scin), and shows that it is not a complete conception ; i.e. that it can- not be thought by itself. It is always only a part conception and has no independence. The other part conception is Naught (Nichts). These two parts are not put together in any external way, but each is originally connected with the other. The organic unity of the two part con- ceptions he calls Becoming (Werden). In the same way Becoming is not a complete thought; it is only part of a larger thought, which in its turn is part of a still larger, till at last we reach the thought of the Absolute Idea. But the thought of the Absolute Idea is itself ovC.y .i partial fact if it is conceived as a mere concep- tion, i.e. as somethin'j that has existed only "in the abstract medium of pure thought." Thought nnist have its objects. These objects we may try to conceive as existing apart from thought, tut this conception is in its turn shown to be as incomplete as that of thought without object. The Absolute Idea then is not a conception in the ordinary sense of the word, but it is a fact, the fact of the inevitable union of thought and object of thought. Again, the inseparability is not .spatial, but temporal. That is to say, Hegel does not mean that the act of thinking and the object thoiight must be in the same place or at the same time. All that he means is that whatever may be the temporal relation between the act of thinking and the object thought, the latter cannot be conceived as existing except either as an actual object of thought or as stand- ing in intelligible relation to some actual ob- ject of thought, just as the act of thinking can- not exist except in thinking some object. Though an interval of time may separate subject and object, an object which stands out of all relation to a subject or a subject which stands out of all relation to an object is inconceivable. In other words, all reality is one, in the sense that all real things, physical or psychical, are inter- connected in such ways Ihat their several reality is not something they have in isolation from the system of real things of which each is an integral part. Hegel's theology and the other parts of Jiis system, such as the philosophy of law, of nature, of art. and of mind, are too subtle to admit of treatment here. Indeed, even the short sketch of the system as a whole, given above, would be rejected by many students of Hegel as inaccurate, so difficult is the task of interpreting Hegel. Hegelianism is a term commonly em- ployed to denote some supposed agreement with his views, but most thinkers who stand close to Hegel fight shy of the term because of the in- definiteness of its connotation. A thinker of th» present day, therefore, hardly ever calls himself an Hegelian. Four years after Hegel's death, a controversy was raised among his followers by Strauss's Lehen Jesu (see Stbauss), and was further imbittered by Strauss's Christliclie Gluu- bcnslehre. The Hegelians then split into thre.; sections, called severally, the right, the left, and the centre, accordingly as they represented super- naturalism, naturalism, or a mediating tendency. The first section was represented, among others, by G. A. Gabler, H. T. W. Hinrichs, and K. T. Giisehel; the leftists, by Bruno Bauer, Feuerljach, Strauss, and K. L. Michelet; the centrists, repre- sented by J. K. Rosenkranz, J. E. Erdmann, and W. Vatke, Weisse, I. H. von Ficlite, the younger Ulrici, Fischer, and Carri6re, were named pseudo-Hegelians, because, though retaining a large element of Hegel's doctrine, they did not follow closely the Hegelian tradition as represented by the three schools. Hegel's phi- losophy has had great influence in other countries than Germany, notably on Britisli and American thought. T. H. Green (q.v.), J. Caird, E. Caird, V. Wallace, J. H. Stirling, B. Bosanquet, F. H. Bradley, H. Jones, J. Watson, D. G. Ritchie. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, in Great Britain, and G. S. Morris, W. T. Harris, and J. Dewey, in the United States, have been more or less influenced by Hegel, although many of these thinkers have attacked Hegelianism. In Ger- many the encouraging patronage extended by the Prussian Government created in the later years of his life a great professorial constituency of Hegelians. But the metaphysical excesses of these Hegelians led to a violent reaction, the efl'ects of which have lasted to the present day. For various views of his sj-stem. consult : Tremle- Itpburg, Loqische Vniersuchungen (Berlin, 1840, .3d ed. 1870) ; Ulrici, Ueber Princip und Methode drr Begelscheii Philosophie (Halle, 1841); A. Schmid, Entwickclungspeschichte der Hegelschen Logik (Regensburg, 1858) ; Janet, Etudes sur la dialectique dans Platon et dans Hegel (Paris, 1S65) : Stirling, The Secret of Hegel (Edin- burgh, 2d ed. 1897) : Harris. HcgeVs Logic (Chi cago, 1890) ; Caird. Hegel (London. 1883) : Bosanquet. Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art (London, 1886), containing also trans- lations of selected portions of Hegel's writings on a'sthctics; Morris, Hegel's Philosophy of the State end nf History (Chicago, 18S8) ; Seth (Pringle- Pattison). Hegelianism and Personality (Edin- burgh, 2d ed. 1803) ; McTaggart. Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic (Cambridsre, 189(i) ; Noel. La logir/ue de Hegel (Paris. 1895) ; Schmitt, Das Geheiinniss der Eenehchen Dialektik (Halle, 1888): Baillie. Heael'S' Loqic (London, 1901); Stibben. Hegel's Logic (New York. 1902) ; the philosophical works of Rosenkranz and of K. L. ^Iicbelet : and the histories of modern philosophy by Ueberweg and Heinze. Windelband. Hiifi'ding, and Erdmann. For his life, consult Rosenkranz. Heycls Leben (Berlin. 1844) : Haym. Hegel und seine Zeit (Berlin, 1857). HEGEL, K.RL VON (1813-1901). A German historian, elder son of the philosopher. He was born at Nuremberg: studied philosophy, theolofrv, philology, and history at Berlin and Heidelberg: was assistant at the Kollnische Gym- nasium in Berlin, became professor of history at Rostock (1841) and at Erlangen (185(iK He was chief editor of Chroniken der deutschen