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* GUSTAVUS I. VASA. 392 GUSTAVUS II. ADOLPHUS. clergy should be dependent on the Crown and enjoy only very moderate emoluments. He was three times married, and had ten eliildren. By an act of the Diet of 1544, at Westeras, the crown was declared hereditary in the male descendants of Gustavus; in conformity with which, his eldest son. Eric (see Eric XIV.), succeeded to the throne on his father's death, September 2S), 1500. Consult: Geijer, Geschichte ScJiiixdens, vol. ii. (Hamburg, 1834) ; Watson, The Swedish Revolution Under (lustavus Vasa (Boston, 1S89), which contains a good bibliography. See Sweden. GUSTAVUS II. ADOLPHUS ( 1594- 1632). King of Sweden from Uill 1o 1(132. and one of the greatest generals of modern times. He was born December 9. 1504, and was the grandson of Gustavus Vasa, by his youngest son, Cliarles IX., at whose death in Kill he succeeded to the throne. Gustavus was brought up in the Lu- theran faith, carefully trained in habits of busi- ness, and was one of the most accom]dished princes of his age. He was educated under the care of .Tohn Skytte, a traveled and accomplished Swede, Von Morner, a German, and James de la (iardie, a Swedish noble of French origin. On his accession to power he found the country in- volved in wars with Denmark, Russia, and Po- land. Two months after his accession Gustavus was declared of age by the Estates and the re- gency was dissolved. The tasks which confronted him "were pressing. It was necessary to wrest a large part of Southern Sweden from the Danes, and to crush the designs of Sigismund of Poland upon the Swedish Crown. To strengthen Sweden for the striiggles which this involved, the young King, with the approval of the great Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna (q.v.). believing that the time iuid come for a halt in the policy of repression of the nobility, which his father and grandfather bad found necessary for the authority of the Ci-ovn, sought to secure the hearty cooperation of the nobles, whose privileges he confirmed, holding them in return strictly accountable for loyal ser- vice. He sought to unite the classes — nobles, clergy, burghers, and peasants — in a common purpose, the upbuilding of Swedish power. ^Yhile reorganizing the internal government the King entered upon a war with Denmark, which ended in .Tanuarv, 1013, with the relinquishment of some Swedish districts of Denmark. Gustavus had a clear appreciation of the importance of Ttussia and of the possible menace to Sweden in Russian aggrandizement, and therefore, after disposing of Denmark, he opened a victorious campaign against Russia. By the peace of Stol- bova. February 27. 1017, Russia ceded to Sweden Ingria and Carclia. The boundary of the Swedish territory then included the site of the future Saint Petersburg. The Russian war was but a prelude to that against Poland in which, during eight years of active campaigning (1021-29), Gustavus devel- oped his innovations in the art of war. trained the Swedish armies, which became noted as the best troops of Euro|ie. and brought out that bril- liant body of commanders who followed him in his later campaigns aiid carried out bis policy after his death. Gustavus conquered all of Livo- nia and Courland. and occupied the Duchy of East Prussia, held by Brandenburg as a fief of the Polish Crown. The war against Poland was to prevent the aggrandizement of Sigismund and to compel his recognition of Gustavus as King of Sweden. In a larger sense it was a defensive war, since tlie ullra-Catholie powers — Spain and the Empire — had schemed to use Sigisnuind as an instrument against the Protestant 'Lion of the North.' Largely through the efforts of Riche- lieu (q.v.), an armistice for si.x years was ar- ranged September 10, 1029, on the basis of a full recognition of Gustavus as King of Sweden, and (iustavus was thus left free to take an active part in (icrmany, where the course of the Thirty Years' War had been steadily against the Prot- estant princes, and the advance of the Imperial- ists under Wallenstein (q.v.) was already threat- ening to establish a new power on the Baltic. In" June, 1030, Gustavus, with an army nf about 13.000 men, landed in Germany to aid the Protestants in their struggle against the Catholic League, backed by the power of the Empire. The Swedes soon drove the Imperialists from Pome- rania. France, through hatred of the Empire, agreed to furnish Gustavus with a subsidy of 400,000 rix-doUars as long as he maintained an army of 30,000 men. The Protestant Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, jealous of this new power in German}', were little inclined to co- operate with Gustavus. but were forced to join the Swedes. On September 17, 1031, Gustavus completely defeated the Imperialists under Tilly at Breilenfeld, near Leipzig, saving the cause of Protestantism just wlien it .seemed threatened with utter destruction. The King now advanced into Franconia_, and after allowing his armies to recruit their strength in the rich bishoprics of Wiirzburg and Bamberg, overran the Palatinate and held a splendid court at Mainz, surrounded by princes and ambassadors. Thence he advanced into Swabia. On April 15, 1032, in the face of Tilly's army, he forced the passage of the Lech, where Tilly was mortally wounded. The road to Vienna was now open to Gustavus. and the Emperor Ferdinand II. in terror recalled his gen- eral. Wallenstein (q.v.), w-ho gathered a large army and advanced to meet Gustavus. The two great commanders confi'onted each other for a time at Nuremberg, before which town Wallen- stein occupied an intrenched position, from which Gustavus. who held Ivuremberg. attempted in vain to dislodge him. Then the armies moved northward and met at Liitzen. southwest of Leip- zig. Here, on November 10, 1032, Gustavus fought his last battle. The Swedes won the day. but in the course of the fighting Gustavus fell, mortally wounded. Bernhard of Weimar (q.v.) succeeded to the command of the Swedish army. Although Gustavus was eminently a warlike king, he made many salutary changes in the internal administration of his country, and de- voted his short intervals of peace to the promo tion of conunerce and manufactures. He was preeminently religious, and his success in battle is ])erliaps to be ascribed not only to a better mode of warfare and the stricter discipline which he cnfcnced. but also still more to the moral influence which his deep-seated piety and his per- sonal character inspired among his soldiers. The spot where he felkon the field of Liitzen was long marked by the Shwedenstein. or Swede's Stone, erected by his servant. Jacob Ericsson, on the night after the battle. Its place has now been taken by a noble monmnent erected to his mem- ory by the German people on the celebration of the second centenary of the battle, held in 1832. He raised Sweden to a commanding position as the