Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 07.djvu/64

* EMOTION. 48 rich its contents; while their high affective value gives them a prominent part in the total 'feel' of the emotion. In sum, then, an emotion arises when (1) the current train of thought is inter- rupted by (2) an assimilation, which represents some situation or incident in our social or pro- fessional world. The assimilation (3) holds the passive attention, and is therefore (4) keenly felt. Moreover, the representative contents and the affective coloring of consciousness are both enhanced by (5) a complex of organic sensa- tions, the result of the way in which the organ- ism as a whole take- the situation in which it finds itself involved. It follows from this ex- treme complication of component processes that the emotion occupies a fairly long period of time, has a distinct temporal course. We should say, indeed, -peaking from unanalyzed experience, that joy and sorrow, hope and fear, may domi- aess, not only for hours, but for days, and sometimes, with intermissions, for and months; while the consequent mood or disposition may continue for years. Such a statement would miss the finer changes of idea- tional trend, and the frequent interposition of foreign consciousnesses thai introspection reveals. Nevertheless, the persistence of the emotion in time, its ripening, maturing, and gradual decay, characteristic that Wundt gives it a tem- poral definition. An emotion, he says, is "a series of feelings, succeeding one another in time, which unite to form an interconnected process that is distinguished, as an individual whole, from preceding and following processes." It fol- low-, further, from the facts of emotive 'expres- sion,' ill. 'I ili- i" i- an intimate relation between emotion and will. Emotion differs from volition only in the point that it fades out or subsides when its course is over, to make way i. i ternary trains of thought and habits of action; while the volition, beginning a- does the emo- tion, end- in "a sudden change oi ensational and affective contents, which brings the emotion to an instantaneous close" — i.e. in a voluntary ac- tion. See > i ion ; Will. There i-. however, anotheT view of the nature of emotion — the James-Lange theory, as it is called which must he noticed here. Simply stated, the theory is that emotion consist tially of organic sensation-. "The bodily changes follow dii ictlj the perception of I lie eXCiting fact," wrote .lame- in 1890, "and our feeling of tangi .' the | occur is i he r i ion. . . The more rational statement i- that we becausi because we ■ i i.i id because we t remble, and not i kit trike, o re are sorry, angry, or fearful." The hypothesis reBts upon line,, principal arguments: [It There can he no doubl that "object do excite bodily changes by a preorganized m," and that "the indefinitely numerou - an. I sub! le that i In- eat ire organism may be called a oi... (2) of I he hudih i'h a i. ■ ... is f, ll aenlel- i in " ( ,'i ) "If we emotion, and then try ioUSl f it all the mptonis. we find we have nothing rtiel 1894) t ' in- means i! nat Ion ; the i b leeumpa n led 'I with EMOTION. agreeableness or disagreeableness. The theory then asserts merely that the 'rank feeling of ex- citement,' characteristic of emotion, is mediated by the organic suggestions aroused by our in- stinctive reaction upon the situation. Even in this form, however, it can hardly be accepted. As regards the three arguments alleged above, those who are opposed to the theory point out that the statement in (1) is certainly exaggerat- ed, while that in (2) is untrue; by no means every bodily change is felt. As to (3), the or- ganic sensations may be invariable concomitants, ingredients, or effects of emotion; they need not, however, be on that account its essential con- stituents. Appeal is made by the defenders of the theory to two classes of facts: (a) In patho- logical cases, where there is complete organic anaesthesia, it is urged, there is also an entire absence of emotion. The opponents reply that such anesthesia is found only where there is also found a very great weakness of the' life of idea and judgment. We should therefore expect, on any theory, to find a corresponding weakening of emotion; the appeal is altogether irrelevant. (b) Emotions may be set up by purely physio- logical means (by the action of drugs and stimu- lants) in which ideas and judgments play no part at all. Palpitation of the heart and feelings of suffocation produce fear; a certain amount of alcohol produces exhilaration and cheerfulness. But, it may be replied, the palpitation and suf- focation are not in themselves terrifying; they terrify because they suggest the idea of death, and the quickening of the blood-circulation and thrills of pleasant warmth that follow the taking of alcohol are not in themselves exhilaration; they bring with them a change in the current of ideation and an altered estimate of new-coming impressions; and it is here, in the changed situa- tion, that we must look for the condition of the Mill emotion. It is char, then, that "the mad to emotion lie- always through the line of ideas" (Stumpf). Moreover, it is pointed out that positive arguments against the theory are at hand: lai If the 'rank feeling of excitement' is constituted of organic sesations, how is it that, we are familiar with these sensations as such; that we can describe them, isolate them by analysis, gauge their intensity. localize them? The sensation of nausea or of strain may be dis- cussed as sensation, pure and simple. Under what circumstances does it lose its sense-identity and become a 'feeling of excitement'? The theory peaks of an 'instinctive' reaction, and of bodily changes following 'directly' upon the exciting I let. But it brings no evidence to show that this reflex or instinctive mode of arousal can change n into a feeling f excitement, (b) If the organic sensations arc of the essence of emo- t hen the emotive consciou ne 3 should evince definite changes in intensity, quality, and tem- poral COUl ' iliiig as tin. organic sensations change in these respeels. It, docs not. for we may have an intensive emotion, without marked peripheral reactions; while, e.g. rage and ex Ireme joy elo-elv lv-emblo eaeh other in their bodilj 'expression,' but an 1, in, means alike in ■ pi ii. hi Hut those who cannot accept the -a mes-Lange " i.v as an adequate account of the emotive 11 > ell heir ' I :l 11 < llial its flll'lll 1 1 111 t idll been, and may yet be. u, f u ] in various way-, it i;i emphasis upon , rtaii mj nts of