Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 07.djvu/418

* EXPATRIATION. 370 EXPECTATION. 1812 Great Britain denied the right of expatria- tion to her citizens, holding that they could not renounce their native allegiance and assume a new one without her consent. This doctrine was accepted by Chancellor Kent as in accord with the principles of the common law. It no longer obtains, however, either in this country or in Great Britain. In 1870 an act of Parliament and a treaty with the United States committed the British Government to an acceptance of the rule contended for by her opponent in the War of 1812. Under this statute and treaty any BritisB subject who at any time may become naturalized in a foreign State shall be deemed to have ceased to be a British subject, and shall be regarded as an alien. Provision is also made for a formal declaration of allegiance by a person who is a British subject according to British law, but a foreign subject according to foreign law. It is fur- ther declared that a British woman by marriage with a subject of a foreign State is expatriated, and that a minor child changes its nationality with the expatriation of its father or widowed mother, provided it resides abroad with such parent. In this country, an American woman is not expatriated by marriage with a foreigner unless she removes from the country with him. Actual departure from the United States is deemed an essential element in expatriation. While our legislation and national poliey are favorable to expatriation, our Government will not undertake to protect persons who have seemed naturaliza- tion here for the purpose of evading some duty to their native State, and not with the bona fide intent to transfer their residence and allegiance to us. Such persons are usually excepted from the operation of treaties which we have entered into with the principal States of Europe, con- ceding the right of expatriation to their subjects who have emigrated to this country. Consult the articles on Ai.ien t ; Law; NATURALIZATION ; and the authorities referred to under those titles. EXPECTATION (l.at. expectatio, from cx- pecture, to expect, from ex, out -+- spectare, to behold, from spicere, to look). Like belief (q.v.), this term must be treated by psychology under two headings: as a complex mental process. characteristic of certain consciousnesses, and as a state of consciousness itself. (See Attention.) ( 1 ) There is general agreement upon the point that expectation, regarded as an item of con- crete experience, must be classed among the emotions. The analysis offered by the different psychologies differs, however, according as the author recognizes two or more than two quali- ties of affection (q.v.). If we believe thai pleasantness and unpleasantness are the -rile af- fective qualities, we may say thai expectation is a collective term, including both hope (pleasant expectation) and fear I unpleasant expectation); jusl as surprise is a collective term, including the emotions of pleased and of unpleasant sur- prise. ! Sec Emotion.) Or we may do as, e.g. Kiilpe does — assume the existence of two types of cm.. lion: on., characterized by the predomi- nance oi :m affective quality, the other by that of a peculiar complex of organic sensations. This supposition seem. however, rather i" cul than to iiicel the difficulty. If. on the other hand, we posil ;, large number of affect ive qualities, we can base expectation upon the quality of tension, as we base joy upon that of pleasantness, "feelings of tension and relaxation." says Wundt, "are al- ways connected with the temporal course of processes. Thus, in expecting a sense impression, we note a feeling of tension, and, on the arrival of the expected event, a feeling of relaxation. Both the expectation and the satisfaction may be accompanied, at the same time, by a feeling of excitement, or, under special conditions, by pleas- urable or unpleasurable feelings. These other feelings may, however, be entirely absent." Wundt thus admits the possibility of an indiffer- ent (neither hopeful nor anxious) expectation, which shall be simply tense or strained. In the present unsettled condition of affective psychol- ogy, it is unwise to make a choice between these two conflicting views; judgment must be reserved until such time as the emotive processes have been brought under experimental control. (2) Considered as a state of consciousness, ex- pectation may be defined as an anticipatory or preparatory attention. In expecting an impres- sion, we set ourselves for its reception ; partly by the proper adjustment of the sense-organ to which the impression will appeal; partly by imaging the occurrence, forming an idea of it; partly by taking up an appropriate bodily atti- tude, and so securing the most favorable back- ground of organic sensations; partly, it may be, by rehearsing, mentally, the judgment that we shall pass upon the event when it takes place. It is clear, from this analysis, that a suitable direction of expectation is the sine qua non of a full apprehension or clear apperception of the impression. Hence it is customary, in all forms of psychological experimentation, to give a signal (a spoken 'Now!' or the stroke of an electric bell) to the observer, at such an interval before the presentation of stimulus that expecta- tion may just have time to reach its maximum, without passing over into fatigue. The time required, at least in the simpler departments of experimental work, amounts to 1.5 or 2 second-. During this period, the observer has an oppor- tunity to concentrate himself upon the problem in hand, either in a general way, by banishing irrelevant ideas and thoughts, or, more specifical ly, by calling up a definite mental image of the coming stimulus. Suppose, e.g. that the two points of a pair of compasses are to be set down simultaneously upon the skin of the wrist, at a certain distance apart, and that the observer is to -ay whether he senses one or two pressures. On hearing the ready-signal, he will (a) devote his attention exclusively to the wrist, and pur posely ignore any accidental stimulation of eye or ear; while (b) if he has had previous experi- ence in the discrimination of two point- upon the skin, he will represent to himself, in terms of pressure sensation, the various forms that cuta- neous 'twoness' may take. Expectation, then, if rightly directed, is of essential service to the experimental p-vchologist. But the predisposition of consciousness may be a source of error, as well as a help, in laboratory work. Suppose thai we wish to ascertain the leasl separation of the compass points thai can evoke the introspective response 'two pressures.' We -hall begin with a separation of the points at which only one pressure is sensed, and gradual- ly increase this separation, in successive trial-, until the judgment 'one' passes over into (he judgment 'two.' We secure the observer's full attention, at each application of the instrument,