Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 07.djvu/272

* ETHICS. 240 ETHICS. in all human beings who know what they are about? Hedonism (q. v.) attempts to furnish an an- swer to the question. It maintains that we ought to be moral., i.e. to do the acts and have the dis- positions ordinarily described as moral, because we desire to obtain the greatest amount of pleas- ure possible or the least possible amount of pain, whether the pleasure and pain be the agent's or some one else's, and because morality is the course which we must pursue in order to obtain this end, which for brevity we shall call the hedonic end. Moral actions are obligatory be- cause the plan of human lives, as involving the pursuit of a maximum of pleasure or a minimum of pain, imposes this obligation as a means to the realization of the hedonic «plan. But ques- tions arise now as to the hedonic plan on which morality as an obligation is said to rest. Is this plan an actual plan in all rational human lives? If not, are those who do not adopt it exempt from morality? If they are not exempt, is this because they ought to adopt the hedonic plan? If they ought to adopt it, what imposes tltis obli- gation? On these points hedonists differ, and it cannot be said that any answers given are satis- factory. Bentham and others maintain, as we have seen, that the hedonic end is the actual end of every human being, and for this reason it out/lit so to be. But Sidgwick, another hedonist, says with point that if an end is an actual end of conduct in every case, there is no propriety in saying that it ought to be : and most modern thinkers would side with Sidgwick. The hedonic plan is not the actual plan of all, or even of most, human lives. Most persons pursue such ends as the acquisition of wealth, of knowledge, of reputation; they do not seek pleasure pure and simple. Nor is it true that they seek wealth, knowledge, and reputation merely because they regard these as means to future pleasure, any more than the normal man eats merely or pre- dominantly for the sake of the pleasure that comes from the stimulation of his palate by food, or from a full stomach. The ordinary man eats his three meals a day, for the mosi part, either because he is hungry or because he has a three- meal habit; it is true that the expectation of pleasure from his meal often has a part to play in the matter: but careful introspection will per- haps show that it is not. often a very influential factor in determining conduct. Most of the things we do are not done for the sake of the pleasure we expect In get from the doing. If, now, it is the hedonic plan that im- poses moral obligation, what about the large number nf persons to wl the hedonic end is not a supreme end ? Are they exempt from moral obligation? It would be a rash hedonist who should say Yes, in face of the l.-ut that these verj persons who do noi pursue a hedonic end yet admit mural obligation. Many hedonists, therefore, prefer to say that the pursuit of pleas are is not always, but always ought to be, the supreme end of life. But if it ought to be, what imposes the obligation? The proposition thai it ought to be is surely not a self -evident fail : too many intelligent persons who have underst 1 clearly the terms of the proposition have denied it point blank; and a proposition denied by an expert may indeed he true, hut it is not sell evi- dent. How, then, prove that every one ought to pursue pleasure? What plan of life is there that can impose such an obligation? To this question several answers have been given. Just one an- swer need be cited here. Some say that reason requires that one should pursue pleasure. Thus Sidgwick in the la>t analysis makes reason dic- tate to rational beings the pursuit 'of the great- est amount of happiness as a whole.' This doc- trine is thus at the bottom very much like Kant's categorical imperative. The objection to this view- is, as we have observed, that many quite rational creatures do not recognize the ration- ality of the end which Sidgwick thinks pre- scribed by 'the dictates of reason.' And there has as yet been no method of argument devised to convince these dissenters that they are wrong. Many persons seem to think that the glory of God reasonably overrides every consideration for 'the greatest amount of happiness as a whole,' while at least some persons think that they are reason- able in pursuing their own private happiness as the supreme end. And yet Sidgwick admits that if anything is reasonable it is objectively valid, and those who cannot recognize its validity are wrong, and can be proved to be wrong. The fact seems to be that no amount of argu- ment will bring about a consensus as to the rea- sonable chief end or sv/mmv/m bonum of all men, because the answer depends upon the nature of the man who gives it. The fact of the depend- ence of aim on desire is evidenced in the changes that take place year by year, sometimes week by week, in the growing boy. His desires change, and with the change there is a corresponding change in his chief end. Values are thus deter- mined by the relative strength and persistence of the desires. There could only be a common chief end for all men if there were a common chief desire in all men. Historically there has been no such thing, but there has been an approximation to a chief desire common to all the members of some single community, and it is to such phe- nomena that we must look for the source of moral obligation. However human communities come to be. there is even - reason to believe that a common morality came gradually into existence only within an already existent community, even though that community were only a small family. Within such a community, with common associa- tions and common attachments, the welfare of the community can well be the object of common de- siTe, and in small and seemingly primitive com- munities which we have an opportunity to know from direct observation, the welfare of the com- munity is usually the object of the most persist- ent of all the intense desires. This can no doubt be in part. i.e. negatively, accounted for by nat- ural selection. Those communities whose mem- bers do not subordinate all other objects to the welfare of society cannot hold together. But this is only a pari explanation. Other factors make positively for (lie same result. Mutual affection is one of these factors; imital iveness is another. We all know well how the child gets his enthu- siasms from his elders. Seeing what they value above all things, he comes to set (lie same supreme value upon this same thing. And this tendency is fostered by the elders in their train ing of the young. The family. I lie elan, (he tribe is glorified in song and story, and no pains an' spared to engender in the young the spirit of loyalty. In this way every normal child within tin' community comes to have a supreme desire shared with all his fellows. The accomplishment