Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 07.djvu/270

* ETHICS. 238 ETHICS. sence of the consciousness of disloyalty to a moral obligation and the ability of the agent to feel an obligation, are universal features of moral conduct. Even the uneasy consciousness of dis- loyalty to a traditionally recognized moral obli- gation is compatible with morality, provided the agent has come to recognize an obligation superior to the traditional ; for his habitual reverence for the old law and the knowledge that he is draw- ing on himself the opprobrium of its adherents may fill him with vague misgivings at the very time when his conduct is prompted by fealty to the new order. He acts against the feeling, while acting in harmony with the knowledge, of moral obligation. Such action, instead of being im- moral, or even non-moral, is a supreme instance of moral heroism. But when the path of duty has been worn smooth by habit, the wayfarer thereon is none the less moral because for the most part he forgets the manner of path he is treading. In the soldier who has been, through severe discipline, habituated to obedience, the sense of coerciveness has disappeared. The sol- dier may no longer be explicitly conscious that some other person exacts of him a certain mode nf behavior. In general, he may no longer exact this of himself. It has become his nature to do this, and that is all there is to it. But often, again, that is not all. There come times when his nature does not prompt him without hesitation. Then the question arises, 'What ought I to do?' This need not mean, 'What must I do to escape the guardhouse?' There may no longer be a consciousness of subordination to some external authority, in the sense of some person or some organization that actually demands compliance with certain rules. And yet there is not the sense of freedom to do anything one may like. Something still ought to be done and something ought not to be done. If, however, habit should have altogether become blind second nature, if the agent should have outlived the ability bo think in terms of obligation, his action would have lost that one distinguishing mark which differentiates morality from what appears to be the non-benevolent cooperative beneficence of ants. If morality is to be a term having any specific meaning, it must be saved from applica- tion to a condition of affairs in which an idea of obligation is never present any more than are "the evils of starvation at a lime when a healthy appetite is being satisfied by a meal" (Spencer). Our conclusion, therefore, is that acts not recog- nized as obligatory may lie moral if performed by beings capable, on due occasion, of recogniz- ing them as obligatory. I'.nt what i-, the consciousness of obligation? In how many forms dors the consciousness of obligation appeal'? What gives rise to these various form-? I low does moral obligation differ from other obligations? All these questions de- mand answer in a systematic ethical discussion. Let us answer the firsl question by saying that no single definition can lie given of obligation. Rather i- il true that there arc at [east two different types of Hi.' consciousness of on eai h ol ■ hieh 'mi i be described in its own way. Following Kant, we may call these two types the categorical ami the hypothetical. In the latter case a person is conscious thai he ought lo do a thin'/ if he want- to secure a cer- tain end: in the other he judges thai he ought to do a thing, without being able to assign anj end as the necessary means of obtaining which the action is obligatory. Taking up first the consciousness of conditional obligation, which is called the hypothetical im- perative, we find that the complex mental process can be described as follows: '1 want a certain result; and I judge that a certain act is indispen- sable if I am to secure that result. Therefore I am conscious that in so far as I am motived by the desire and directed by my judgment I must in consistency perform the act.' The fact that when a certain desire and a certain judgment respecting the means of satisfying this desire are present in consciousness a certain act is re- quired for consistency's sake, is the fact of hy- pothetical or teleological obligation. When I experience that requirement in my conscious- ness I say that I ought to do that act. Man as desiring and as not securing a certain object is man at odds with his environment. Man as de- siring and yet as not doing what he knows to be necessary to secure a certain object is man at odds with himself. He is inconsistent. His ac- tion does not comport with his desire, and be- cause he knows that there is this incompatibility his action does not comport with his knowledge. It is unintelligent and irrational. The irration- ality of the act is concrete and not abstract. It consists in incongruousness with a known definite situation. Vary the situation, and the demand of reason or the obligation varies likewise. The obligation is contingent, because reason itself alone cannot create it. But given a desire and a knowledge of some means to gratify it. and there always is in a thinking being, just so far as he thinks, the consciousness of the incompatibility be- tween the existence of the desire and a failure to perform the act known to be a necessary means of satisfying the desire. In case there are two desires, and the necessary measures to be taken to appease them cannot both be taken, there arises a conflict of obligation. This conflict is adjusted only when one desire has become superior to the other. Then its corresponding obligation be- comes superior also. Reason takes into consid- eration the ascendency of this desire, and in this concrete situation decides in favor of that con- duct which this desire imposes. Often the part played by reason in the conflict of obligations is still greater, for it often happens that the rela- tive strength of a desire is modified by knowledge of the results that, follow il- gratification. Its nature as desire is not changed; it doe- not cease to he desire because it is modified by knowledge of consequences. Hut as a desire which is the function of reasoned knowledge, it is a concretely rational desire. Now, in the case of a conflict of obligations, il happens frequently that a con- cretely rational desire is stronger than random desires, ami its correlative obligation is supreme over competing obligations. Tn such a case we have in the fullest sense a supreme reasonable obligation, which, however, is after all condi- tional or Ideological. But there are obligations which are categorical. Often we do not say to ourselves. 'Ho this he- cause you want that.' but merely. 'Do this.' There arises in consciousness a command saving 'Thou shall.' or 'Thou shall not.' and often this commandment is recognized as having rightful authority. How does this command arise! To some extent, without question, il arises l,y reason of an economical tendency to abbreviation,