Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 07.djvu/269

* ETHICS. 237 ETHICS. our point of view modus of conduct approved in foreign lands and in past ages may be, some defl- nite course of conduct has always been regarded as binding. Tin- fact of tl bligation oi si act or another, it is asserted, is, and lias always liccii, recognized by every liiiman being. There is the form of imperativeness, so the contention inns, in all human consciousness; this constitutes the framework of morality. The content, the matter, of morality varies indefinitely; the form is immutable. Some such thought as this con- trolled the mind of Socrates in his attempt to dis- prove the doctrine of relativity (q.v.), as applied by the Sophists (q.v.) to the ethical life. Plato at times hypostatized this immutable essence of morality into the eternal "form of the good." Aristotle, doing justice to another type of moral experience, found morality to consist in certain obligations hnpo-ed 1 > y the desire to secure cer- tain ends. Christian theology, following Saint Paul, construes it as God's law of righteousness — "that which may be known of God" and "is mani- fest even in the Gentiles, for God manifested it unto them" (Rom. i.). "For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law. these having not the law are a law unto themselves; which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their con- science also being witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another" (Rom. ii. 14. 15). Ethical intuition- ism (q.v.) takes its cue from traditional theol- ogy, and finds a 'faculty' of conscience in every man: a faculty which may become atrophied in those who stiff-neckedly refuse to give it play, but which is an always present element in the original equipment of faculties possessed by every man. Ethical rationalists (see Rationalism), of whom Kant is the great protagonist, ascribe to pure reason an invariable mandatory activity, which operates in every rational being to the production of a recognized obligation to do certain things and to leave certain things undone, just because this doing and this leaving undone is pure reasonableness. In Kant this demand of pure reason is formulated in the principle, "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This he calls the "one categorical impera- tive." This "law contains no conditions restrict- ing it;" it "is objectively necessary in itself without reference to any purpose." It has its seat and origin completely a priori (q.v.) in the reason, and that, moreover, in the commonest reason just as truly as in that which is in the highest degree speculative; "it is just the purity of" its "origin that makes" it "worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle." "There is no genuine supreme principle of morality but" this which rests "simply on pure reason, inde- pendent of all experience." Hedonism (q.v.) roots the universal, unvarying form of morality in the desire of every sentient being to secure pleasure. In what Professor Sidgwick calls the psychological form of hedonism, the view is held that "on the occasion of every act he exercises, every human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the high- est degree contributory to his own greatest hap- piness" (Bentham). ' In the ethical form of hedonism it is conceded that "men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know if to be i m le :i luable ; and I In- no !,■ - w hen the choice i- between two bodily pleasures than when il i Im-I wen bod ilj B lid lilal." But w hili- line thus do choose the lesE valuable pleasure, "il maj be questioned whether any one who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pica- ever knowingly and calmly preferred tin- lower." Sappiness i- "the rational purpose of hu n life ami action" (.1. s. Mill), 'the happiness which reason prescribes a-, tin- proper end of life may be conceived as one's own happiness (ego istic ethical hedonism), or ii maj be the happi- ness of all sentient creatures (universalistic cilii eal hedonism). But llowever narrowly or broad- ly conceived, reason i- said to demand an effort in secure it and thus to impose an obligation. Perfectionists claim that what is demanded is not happiness, but the full, harmonious develop- ment of one's nature and of the nature ot one's fellows, until we all attain unto the stature of tic perfect man. Certain evolutionists consider the supreme end which imposes obligation to con- sist in improvement of 'the social tissue' (Leslie Stephen). In all these views it will be seen there is an insistence upon the fact that ob- ligatoriness is an essential mark of morality. Though they differ widely as to the source of obligation, they all agree that coextensive with morality is the phenomenon of obligation. On the other hand, we find some writers who main- tain that obligation is only an accident of moral ity. Herbert Spencer, in his Data of Ethics, comes to the "conclusion, which will be to most very startling, that the sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory and will diminish as fast as moralization increases." "With complete adaptation to the social state, that element in the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word obligation will disappear. The higher actions, required for the harmonious carrying on of life., will be as much matters of course as are these lower actions which the simple desires prompt. In their proper times and places and proportions, the moral sentiments will guide men just as spontaneously and adequately as now do the sensations." Among the poets this view is by no means rare. These two opposing interpretations of morality -^■the one that regards the consciousness of obli- gation as indispensable to morality-, and the one that regards it as a transitory feature which will lie outlived — are each in part true and in part false. The facts warrant us in saying that it is not necessary to the morality of an act that the agents should regard it as obligatory. Of actions which, except upon some preconceived; theory, no one would hesitate to pronounce moral, a large proportion is spontaneous or habitual. A cup of cold water, even when not given "in the name of a disciple." or of the- giver's or the recipient's "pleasure," or of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." or of "the social tissue." or of somebody's "perfeo tion," or of "the moral sense," or of "a uni- versal law of Nature," may yet change hands in an unquestionably moral act. What is requirerS to make the gift moral is that it should bo made by a moral agent — i.e. by one who is, ,i pable of the consciousness of obligation, and that it should not be regarded bv him as a contraven- tion of moral obligation. Xot the presence of the consciousness of moral obligation, but the ah-