Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 07.djvu/268

* ETHICS. 236 ETHICS. ment such knowledge is not necessary. It is only necessary to know that if we knew that the cat did not think of herself as we do of ourselves ; if we knew that before acting she could not present to herself an idea of herself as acting in one way, and then an idea of herself as acting in the other way, we should not treat her as a moral being. If, on the other hand, we knew the contrary, we should be tempted to take a different moral atti- tude toward her. A third characteristic of moral consciousness is that the idea of self as doing or being has a mo- tive value. It attracts or repels. Not only does the moral agent have at times the idea of him- self as doing this thing or not doing it, but he likes or dislikes the idea of himself as doing or ' not doing it. Such an idea of self which attracts the agent to realize it in act is called an ideal self. But not all our ideals are moral, so that the account we have as yet given of the moral con- sciousness is not adequate. We have perhaps al- ready sufficiently covered the generic features of developed morality, but its specific features have not been recounted. The definition of a moral agent as an agent with an ideal self, an end which excites desire, and enters into competition with other ends, leaves out of account the social nature of morality, the fourth characteristic to be mentioned. Indeed, the social character of morality is so important that many writers have gone so far as to identify morality with sociality. In this, as in other extreme views, there is an element of truth, and in this case that element is of the most momentous import. The ideal, to be ethical, must be a social ideal. That is, the idea of self which is the end of action is in morality and immorality the idea of a self in essential relation to other selves. Man. as Aris- totle wisely observed, is by nature a social ani- mal, and human morality is social to the core. Whether any other morality is possible is not here in question. We are now trying to describe the morality we know, which gets one of its most distinctive features from man's social nature. This is made evident by an appeal to the reli- gions, in which morality comes to partial expres sion : the codes of all great religions deal largely, if not almost entirely, with social duties. Con- fucian, Buddhist, Hebraic, Christian, and Moham medan prescriptions for regulating conduct consist in large measure of rules regulating social inter- course. Historical morality is social: and when we say that it is social, we say that it is in a sense objective. It is not a matter of the individual's arbitrary construction, lie dues not cl so bis ideal entirely at his good pleasure. He finds a general ideal in the society into which, he is born and in which lie is reined, and this ideal forms at least the poinl of departure fur his own mature ideal. There are certain things expected of a member of society, and this expecta- tion forms :i nucleus around which the individual ethical development proceeds. The moral man mil break away completely from these tradi- i omplete breach with the obsi 1 1 a nces of his community would at once stamp a man as immoral, d here again, lei it be noticed, we are net asking whether il ought t.i be so, but i h whether it is so. We musl repeal that we cannol tell whal morality oughl t<> be until we have discovered whai it actually is, and the actual fact is that the moral man is one who is "centered in the sphere of common duties." Another feature of morality needing mention is that these common duties have in most cases a real or assumed reference to the welfare of the community. The obvious reason for the con- demnation of murder, adultery, rape, theft, lying, cowardice, and intemperance, to mention some of the most prominent objects of moral judgment, is that these acts are injurious to society. The murderer, the adulterer, the ravisher, the thief, the liar, the coward, and the intemperate are common enemies, and the disapproval they re- ceive is, at least in part, the natural reaction of society against its foes. That in great measure morality is action really or supposedly conducive In social welfare, and immorality is action really or supposedly conducive to social degeneration, is proved by the fact that actions once regarded as ethically indifferent come to be regarded as moral or immoral when the general opinion comes to regard them as socially beneficial or injurious. The gradual change in the moral status of slav- ery, of concubinage, of general sexual laxity in men. of the duel and the vendetta, is historically traceable to growing insight into the social con- sequences of these practices. The process of the moralization of formerly ethically indifferent acts is observable in our own day. In many places lynching is morally justified by the com- munity at large. The mob law exercised on some dastard criminal is considered moral because it not only 'serves him right,' but also is supposed to protect society against future outrages. But when it is seen that such protection does not pro- tect, hut tends to undermine the very foundation of law. and thus render society insecure, a senti- ment grows that lynching is morally wrong. The sentiment lags behind the insight, but it follows it, even though at some distance. Not only is it true that obviously injurious actions are mor- ally condemned, but supposedly injurious actions are likewise condemned. It is thus patent that real or presumed relation to social welfare is a constituent element in morality. It should be re- marked here that nothing has been said of the size of the community with whose welfare moral- ity is bound up. Anthropology teaches that in primitive communities moral obligation has no reference to anything outside of the family, the elan, or the tribe. Even at the present day many a man who would not think of swindling a neigh- bor may have no scruples when it comes to taking advantage of a foreigner, especially if the foreign- er be of a nationality utterly alien to his own. The community within which moral relations are recognized need not be in any sense one of blood relationship. It may be one of trade or calling, or it may be sonic quite artificial fraternity. this goes to show thai actual morality is not catholic and cosmopolitan, hut is apt to he cliqu- ish and clannish, and the size of the community involved is determined by various causes. But these fuel- .hi nut make against the statement that moral consciousness, wherever found, is the consciousness of social import, or of an ideal self who lakes delight in and works fur the wel- fare of some fellow lieiii L .s organized together in seme way. We have as yet left out uf iieeount what proh ably many would regard as the most distinctive feat ore nf morality — the consciousness of obliga tion. Thus, it is alleged, however erratic from