Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 06.djvu/519

* DKEAMING. 451 DKEAMING. from the pcriphoiiil excitations. Here is clear evi- Ueiice that the lirain has received its dream-cue from the eye. Similar tests have been carried out, with similar though less striking result, upon the other sense-organs. As a general rule, then, the dream-consciousness is started by some sensory stimulus, though, having once orig- inated, it may ciintinie its course in ol)pdicnce to the laws of association (q.y.) without any further interference from the outside. We have supported this conclusion by an appeal to the eye; and tlio appeal has, doubtless, appeared quite natural. For dreams are pre- dominantly visual: so strongly visual, indeed, that it is not rare to find them defined, in so many words, as 'trains of fantastic images.' There is good reason for this preponderance of visual mind-stvitr in dreams: (11 Most of us, in the waking life, are likely to think, imagine, and remember in visual terms: we are ■eye- minded.' It is evident that this ingrained habit of mind toward visualization must show itself in dreams. (2) The retina is in a constant state of intrinsic excitation during sleep: the retinal gray and the light dust will, if only the chance be given them, make themselves known in sensation. (.3) And the chance nuist be given them fairly frequently. For sight is the first sense to disappear, as sleep comes on, and the last sense to be regained on waking: so that the eye may be stinuilated, during sleep, with a moderately high degree of intensity, while the sleeper is still not disturbed. Dreams, how- ever, are by no means exclusively visual. Xext in order of frequency to dieams of sight stand. perhaps, the dreams whose principal material is organic and temperature sensations. It is curious to note that dreams which are initiated by an organic sensation la pain, a suffocation, a" cramp) are oftentimes translated into terms of vision. A slight intercostal pain may be dreamed of 'in kind' as a dagger-thriist. or the bite of a mad dog: but we shall probably see the dagger and the dog — and. in many cases, these will be the main objects of the dream, the organic sensation being present merely as a vague discomfort. So the rhythm of breathing may be 'seen' as a flight of birds or of angels; and an irritation of the skin may be 'seen' as a host of caterpillars or beetles crawling over us. This fact of translation into the language of sight has done much to divert attention from the very conuuon occurrence of organic sensa- tion in the dream-life. In the third (or, as some authors would say, in the second) place, come dreams of hearing. Conversation is the one form of external stimulus that, in everyday life, approaches the visual stimuli of our sur- roundings in regularity and insistency, and frag- ments of conversation are the most frequent auditon,- constituents of dreams. Sounds like the humming of bees and the clatter of musketry — the dream interpretations of the intrinsic noises of the car — follow next in order. Tonal or musical dreams occur, but are rare. Finally, the senses of smell, taste, and cutaneous pres- sure may and do contribite elements to our dreams: but these elements are extremely liable to visual translation, and appear but rarely in pure form. The dream-eonseiousness is not confined, of course. to sensations, perceptions, and ideas. Kvery mental formation that is found in the waking life may be represented (or simulated) in the dreaming state. Thus the presence of emotion in dreams — surprise and excitement; fear and sluime; disappointment and anger; jealousy and perplexity — is a matter of exi)ericnce. In- deed, the appearance of emotion follows almost as a matter of course from the large part played in dreaming by the organic sensations. (.See Feeli.nc; KllOTlox.) We have, further, fre- quent instances of passive memory, i.e. of the recognition of persons or places — recognitions which our waking consciousness not seldom de- clares to be false recognitions, but which, none the less, have the true recognitivc form and 'feel'; of active memory, efforts of recollection; of passive imagination, the sup])Iementing in idea of the situation before us in (seeming) perception: of active imagination, e.g. the writ- ing of ])oetry: of resolve and voluntary en- deavor; and of active attention. In illustra- tion of the latter, we may take the following dream: "I was trying to find the name of a philosophical writer, which I knew began with D. I ran through the index of the book I held in my hand, but could not find the name. Then I went to the shelf; took down another book, and ran throiigh its index in the same way, with successful result." So far, indeed, may this reprodviction or simulation go. that we some- times dream that we are dreaming. We sa_v, in ordinary life. "The whole thing seemed like a dream" ; and the same experience of dream- likeness reoccurs in the dream-consciousness. We have spoken of the 'reproduction or simu- lation' of mental formations. Our dream poetry, if it be rc.nlly composed during sleep and not in the half-waking state before comidete arousal, is neither rhyme nor reason : the foreign lan- guages that we speak so fluently in dreams are unfamiliar to us in the waking life: our dream resolves are inefiective: our dream recognitions, as we have said, are oftentimes false. These observations have led to the theory that the dream-eonseiousness is composed, in reality, of a mere panorama of images; and that the complex mental formations which seem to occur in dreams are really imaginary. There is, how- ever, no cause for going beliind the clear ver- dict of introspection. The formations occur; but, owing to the extreme limitation and irregu- lar distribution of attention in the dreaming state, they show characteristic differences from the corresponding formations of the waking life. Here, indeed, is the crucial problem that the dream presents to psychology-. The arrangement of ideas in dreaming is fantastic and disorderly; yet, as the dream comes, we accept its events and incidents unquestioned, taking everything for granted. How are we to account for these seemingly opposed facts? (1) The fantastic nature of the dream is explained by the almost unrestricted freedom of association in the dream- consciousness. Our waking consciousnesses are regulated by pressure of outside circumstances. In dreaming, as in reverie, there is a practical absence of regulation: an idea of our childhood is as likely to arise as an idea of yesterday; the sequence of ideas may be logical, but may al-o be determined by the most trivial and irrelevant of connecting links. .s a rule, the fundamental things of mind (space-perception, personal identity) remain; but even these may