Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 05.djvu/111

* COAST DEFENSE. 83 COAST DEFENSE. endeavoring to remove the mines. The counter- attacking torpedo Uotilla must be followed by one or two mine-laying ships, for repairing the dam- aged mine lines. The attacker's ol>ject in reconnaissance is to obtain full and accurate knowledge of the location and power of the defender's gims of all calibres and kinds, the position of the torjjedo batteries and mine observation stations, and finally to lind out what new gun positions have been erected for the war. The defense, therefore, endeavors to veil all his batteries that cannot be readily seen from the sea, and to still further deceive the en- emy he erects a number of small batteries. Batteries with disai)pearing carriages and mortar batteries have liere a great tactical advantage, becatise they can be readily concealed. While the fleet is recoiuioitring, therefore, beyond the outer mines, only such guns of the defense open fire as cannot be concealed, but as the ships come near the mines, and take tip the formation in coluuui, the other batteries open fire and with armor-pierc- ing projectiles. Each battery is assigned to a different ship, on which it concentrates its fire, and which it follows until it is sunk or gets be- yond armor-piercing range. The coast artillery is assisted in this work by the guns of the ships that may be in the harbor, these vessels moving inside the mine field on lines perpendicular to the enemy's line of advance, making the greatest possible use of their artillery, the torpedo-boats making counter-attacks when possible. The in- fantry garrison of the fortified place is posted on outpost along the shore, and prevents the enemy from landing reconnoitring parties, or fires on torpedo-boats sent along the shore to reconnoitre. In case the mine obstruction was removed by the enemy before his reconnaissance, the defender's larger vessels cannot take so advanced a position close up to the mine field, and as soon as the at- tacker approaches the latter the defender must bring all his guns into action. The object of the artillery attack is to silence all coast forts and batteries commanding the har- bor entrance, to put out of action all guns mounted in them, and to destroy all positions flanking the obstructions. It is the preparation for the final assault. The main strength of the defense in this phase of the action will be the coast artillery, and since the enemy, because of his limited supply of ammunition, will probably endeavor to gain the upper hand as rapidly as possible, this artillery will require an energetic, decisive, and rapid serice, and should be assisted by the artillery fire of the ships of the defense that may be in the harbor. The tai-gets to be attacked are mainl}- the large, hea'y battle-ships. of which the vital parts are protected by power- ful armor. The latter must be destroyed to put the ship out of action, and this is a task set for the heavy guns. The conduct of the coast ar- tillery must be systematic, and hence the com- mand of fortified places is tuider a fortress com- mander, under whom are the district commanders, and these again control the group of battery commanders and the search-light stations. The heavier armor of a battle-ship is on her belt, ex- tending above and Iielow the Avater-line. while the deck is but slightly protected. The large calibre, flat-trajeetory guns are used for piercing the heavy side armor, and with the new United States explosive D (or another of equal value, ilaxi- mite), and the delay-action fuse of the Ordnance Department, the destructive effect is exiiccted to be enormous. Howitzer or mortar shells are used for piercing deck armor; rapid-lire guns for firing on unprotected parts and clearing decks and tops. The naval battle of Santiago clearly illus- trated the value of a good artillery, and if such a magnificent action is possible from aboard ship, a far more favorable eft'ect is to be expected from the land. But this battle also shows how dangerous it is to neglect all i)rcparatioiis on the part of the coast artillery, and the S])anish coast artillery must bear a large portion of the blame for the sacrifice of Cervera's fleet. Special at- tention must be paid to the equipment of the ob- servation stations of the district artillery com- niaiulers. Good telescopes and photographs and plans of the enemy's ships must be on hand for immediate use, to enable them to recognize the dift'erent ships, and in the group and battery com- manders' stations there must be more detailed plans of the ships to determine the projectiles to be used at various ranges. Works are now pub- lished giving, in silhouette, the appearance (to the naked eye, at a particular distance) of every important war-ship. The inner obstructions consist of lines of mines, sea barricades, and occasionally also of a subma- rine dike. The decisive engagement for the pos- session of the harbor will be fought at this bar- rier, for which reason it is protected by numerous rapid-fire and torpedo batteries. The reconnais- sance of the inner obstructions, and even their partial removal, may be attempted by the enemy during the artillery duel, hence the defender must make constant use of his searcli-lights to detect such a move. The assailant will first attempt to destroy the inner obstructions by means of tor- pedo-boats, then he will try to break them up by artilleiy fire, and finally he may attempt to land detachments at night to blow them up, or send a drifting mine-destroyer against them. The inner mines are usually within the effective armor- piercing range of the heaw guns, as well as under the fire of the rapid-fire batteries; the former act against the armored ships, the latter against the small and fast torpedo-lioats or un;'.rmored ves- sels. The forcing of the entrance is the closing act of the assailant's undertaking, and its object is the .inal occupation of the disputed harbor. At the head of the final assault are toriiedo-boats which, acting as a patrol, make a final attempt to break through the obstructions. These, as well as the tori)edo flotilla following them, should be greeted with a hail of jirojectiles from the rapid-fire guns of the shore batteries. All other coast guns and howitzers should be directed against the battle-ships of the attacking fleet, and should fire especially at the leading ship. As the attacl>;ing vessels enter the harbor the fire of the coast guns is concentrated more and more against the vessels following. This artillery battle is continued until each fort in succession is taken by the enemy. The home fleet inclosed in the har- bor should new attempt to break through the lines at all hazards, and this can best be done at .night. Unfortified coast regions are subjected to attack by the enemy's fleet, the pttrpose being either to support the o)iei'ations of a land army, or to attack a fortified harbor from the land side, Military histoiy proves that it is by no means easy to capture a well-defended harbor by the