Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 02.djvu/817

BELIAL. ever we may account for it, Belial was personi- fied and became a designation of the arch-demon Satan (II. Cor. vi. 15). The etymology which until recently was current, dividing the word into two parts, beli, 'without,' and yaal, 'worth,' is to he rejected. It has been satisfactorily shown by Cheyne (Expositor, 1895, pp. 435- 439) that the word belial is used in the Old Testament in three senses: (1) great wicked- ness; (2) hopeless ruin; and (3) subterranean watery abyss (Ps. xviii. 4). In view of this third meaning Cheyne proposes to connect Be- lial with Belili, a goddess of the underworld in Babylonian mythology. There is much to be said in favor of this view, though of course we must assume that the term, after coming to the Hebrews, was developed (as were the other mythological terms of foreign origin) in a man- ner that in the course of time separated it from its Babylonian prototype.

BELIANIS (ba'R-il'nes) OF GREECE. A continuation of Amudis of Gaul, by Jeronimo Fernandez (1547). It was translated from the Spanish into Italian in 1586, into English in 1598, and into French in 1625. It was one of the books in Don Quixote's library, and was cen- sured there by the 'curé' for its masses of ex- trinsic detail. Another English version appeared in 1673.

BÉLIDOR, bii'le'dor', (c. 1698-176 ). A French military engineer, born in Catalonia. He was the inventor of military mining, and continues an authority on subjects connected with hydraulic architecture and artillery. He published Sommaire d'un cours d'architecture militaire, civile et hydraulique (1720); Traité des fortifications (1735), and other works.

BELIEF' (the verb believe, AS. gelýfan, Goth, galaubjan, Ger. glauben, literally means to esteem dear, to value; cf. E. lief, Goth. liubs, dear, Lat. libet, lubet, it pleases, Ger. Liebe, love). In discussing the subject of Belief, the psychologist has to distinguish sharply between two related questions: that of the composition of the believing or assenting consciousness, and that of the nature of belief as an attitude or function of mind at large. Under the former head (1) we find the most diverse views prevailing in the different psychological systems. Locke (1632-1704), James Mill (1773-1836), and Herbert Spencer offer a purely intellectualistic analysis. For Locke, belief is an association of ideas on the ground of probability. If the association corresponds to a natural connection among the objects of idea, the belief is right; otherwise, it is wrong. The reasons for erroneous assent are to be found in want of proofs; want of ability or will to use them; and wrong measures of probability (reliance on authority, yielding to passion). Mill declares, in similar vein, that in every instance of belief there is an indissoluble association of ideas. "I never have a sensation, nor the idea of that sensation, without associating with it the idea of myself. ... In the case of a present sensation, and that of a present idea, the sensation and the belief in the sensation, the idea and the belief in the idea, are not two things; they are, in each case, one and the same thing." Those psychologists who deem these analyses defective have pointed out that while belief always implies the presence in consciousness of ideational material, the object of belief, it is rather a feature of the emotional and volitional than of the purely intellectual life. This fact is recognized by Bagehot, when he speaks of the "emotion of conviction"; by James, when he defines belief as "a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions than to anything else"; and by Bain, who, postulating a primitive tendency to credulity as he postulates a primitive tendency to spontaneous movement, describes belief as "in its essential character a phase of our active nature, otherwise called the will." When we remember how close is the connection between emotion and volition ("the emotion itself, together with its result, is a volitional process": Wundt), we see that it is a matter of comparative indifference whether the affective or the voluntary aspect of belief receives emphasis in the definition; the important thing is to avoid the intellectualistic fallacy of the associationist school.

(2) The nature of belief as an attitude or function of the mind at large. — That belief can be envisaged, not as a complex of conscious processes, but as a state of consciousness (see ), appears in Hume's (1711-70) account of it. "Belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object than the imagination alone is ever able to attain. It consists ... in the manner of the conception [of the ideas] and in their feeling to the mind. ... It gives them more weight and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; enforces them in the mind." Hume does not profess "perfectly to explain" this mode of conception. He is followed by J. S. Mill, who asserts that the difference between "thinking of a reality and representing to ourselves an imaginary picture" is "ultimate and primordial"; and by Brentano, who makes 'judgment' one of the elementary conscious functions. Without questioning the uniqueness of the state of assent, we may say, in general, that belief is a state of attention, with extreme liability of suggestion in a given direction.

James, Psychology (New York, 1890); Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (London, 1869); Bain, The Emotions and the Will (London, 1890); Spencer, Psychology (New York, 1881); Locke, Essays (London, 1894); Hume, Inquiry (Oxford, 1894); Brentano, Psychologie (Leipzig, 1874).

BEL INCONNU, bel aN'k,ynu', (Fr., the Fair Unknown). A fair young knight of unknown parentage, who King Arthur decreed should be thus surnamed. He appears in a secondary Round-Table legend of the same name, written by Renauld de Beaujeu.

BELIN'DA. See.

BELINE, ba'len'. A character in Le malade imaginaire, by Molière. She is the wife of Argan, who craftily discovers that her protestations of love are false.

BELISAIRE, ba'l.vsilr'. (1) The title of a tragedy by Rotrou (1643). (2) The name of a political romance by Marmontel (1767). In it the author attacks the spirit of religious intolerance then prevailing, and raises a tempest of indignant outcries. The work was declared blasphemous, and all Paris was intensely excited over it.

BELISARIO, ba'le-za're-o. The title of an opera by Donizetti, first given in Venice (1836).