Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 02.djvu/120

ARTILLERY. only the guns left over from the Civil War. These were principally Rodman smooth-bores and Parrot rifles, both cast-iron and muzzle-loaders. They were supplemented in 1872 by the addition of 8-inch muzzle-loading converted rifles, the old 10-inch Rodman being utilized for this purpose. The leading position of American artillery in 1861 was largely due to Lieutenant Rodman, of the United States Army. His principle consisted essentially in casting guns by cooling from the interior. The system of artillery in the United States at the beginning of the Civil War embraced the following: "Field: Wrought-iron 3-inch rifle, bronze 6- and 12-pounder guns, 12-pounder Napoleon, 12-pounder mountain, and 12-, 24-, and 32-pounder howitzers. Siege and garrison: Cast-iron 4½-inch rifle, 12-, 18-, and 24-pounder guns, 24-pounder and 8-inch howitzers, and 8-inch and 10-inch mortars: Coehorn mortars (bronze). Sea-coast: 32-pounder gun. 8-, 10-, and 15-inch Columbiads, 10- and 13-inch mortars. The total embraced seven different calibres of guns, three of Columbiads, four of howitzers, and four of mortars, or eighteen altogether — the same as in 1850. In 1861 the smooth-bore system of the United States was certainly excellent. In quality of cast-iron used, and its manipulation during manufacture, it has been claimed, and with good reason, that the ordnance department of the United States Army led all others. If not the first upon the ground, the department was among the pioneers in heavy modern armaments, as was shown by the casting, successfully in that year, of what at the time was the most powerful weapon known — a 15-inch Rodman gun, followed, in 1864, by a similar but 20-inch smooth-bore, throwing a shot weighing 1080 pounds. This was a grand stride, and placed the American artillery in no secondary position in the array of national armaments at that time developing." (Birkhimer, Historical Sketch of the Artillery, United States Army, Washington, 1884).

(1866). During this war, nothing of importance, either in materiel, organization or tactics, was developed by either the Austrians or Prussians. The field-battery of the Prussians consisted of six guns, generally steel breech-loading rifled guns, called 6- and 4-pounders, the first class using a 15-pound oblong shell, and the latter a similar 9-pound shell. Shell-fire, using percussion fuse, was used almost exclusively. The Austrian artillery, on the other hand, was armed with muzzle-loading rifles (8- and 4-pounders), each battery containing eight pieces. The Austrians still retained the system of 'brigade' artillery, and used rocket batteries. In this war 'brigade' artillery and rocket batteries appeared for the last time, and breech-loading rifled field-guns for the first time. The Prussians handled their artillery ineffectively during the entire war, the Austrians being far superior to them in initiative and dash.

The Prussians made great improvements in artillery after 1866, and their use of artillery in 1870 was one of the most important military lessons of that war. Reserve artillery disappeared, and divisional and corps artillery alone was employed. To each cavalry division two batteries of horse ar- tillery were attached. The guns employed were steel breech-loading rifles, 6- and 4-pounders. The proportion of artillery was 3.7 guns to a thousand men. The French used muzzle-loading rifles (8- and 4-pounders). A few 12-pounder Napoleon guns seem still to have been in service. The mitrailleuse used by them was a machine gun. Their proportion of artillery was three guns to 1000 men. "The characteristic features of the artillery tactics of the Franco-German War may be summed up as follows: On the march, the German artillery was no longer kept in rear of columns of infantry, but was pushed well to the front, being preceded only by enough infantry to protect it from surprise. It was brought into action at the very first opportunity, and almost invariably in large masses, which concentrated their fire upon the objective of the infantry at- tacks. Its fire, in almost every case, was delib- erate and accurate, and was employed at ranges varying from 3300 to 650 yards; while the French wasted their ammunition in a rapid fire at ranges too long for the best effect. The French committed the further fault of retaining their batteries too long in reserve, and employing them too often singly instead of in masses. The mitrailleuse did not meet the high expectations that had been formed of it, though its effect was sufficient to foreshadow the extensive use of machine guns in future wars. Borbstaedt acknowledges that these guns did produce a considerable effect, partly from the strange, rattling noise they made, partly from the rapidity with which an immense number of projectiles were fired; and he says: 'It cannot be denied that the French mitrailleuses caused heavy losses to the attacking German troops, especially in positions where it was possible to keep them concealed till the decisive moment had arrived.' The mistake of pitting these guns against the German field-artillery was frequently and disastrously made by the French. They were good only in the defense of positions." (Wagner, Organization and Tactics, New York. 1895).

The guns used by the Russians in this war were inferior to those used by Prussia seven years before. They were bronze breech-loading rifles, the heavy being 9-, and the light, 6-pounders. The materiel of the Turkish artillery was superior to that of the Russians, being composed of Krupp's steel breech-loading rifle guns, 8 and 9 centimetres calibre (3.2 and 3.5, inclusive). The Russians had 3.9 guns to 1000 men, the Turks only 2.2. During this war nothing new was developed either in organization, materiel, or tactical handling of field artillery.

During the Spanish-American War of 1898, there was little opportunity for the use of artillery at Santiago or elsewhere. The American field-artillery used 3.2-inch breech-loading steel rifles. Unfortunately, smokeless powder had not been supplied to these batteries, the result of which was the exposure of the exact position of the batteries to the Spanish artillery and riflemen. Smokeless powder was supplied immediately after this fight. The 3.6-inch field-mortar was used to a limited extent. The siege-train included the 3.6-in. gun and mortar, 5-inch siege-gun. and 7-inch howitzer. It was organized at Tampa, Fla., but never used. In the Philippines and China the 3.2-inch United States field and experimental mountain guns, purchased here and abroad, were employed.

In this war, as in the