Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 01.djvu/787

APPORTIONMENT BILLS. figures show the variations of apportionment made for each census:

The House had grown rapidly in number of members until 1830. when it was found that it would soon become unwieldy unless the number of representative population required to a member should be largely increased; so the ratio was increased by one-half (raised from 47,700 to 70,080). Since then the purpose has been to keep the House below 300 members, and the ratio is raised regularly while the number of members is seldom increased unless by the addition of new States. In that way the House was increased by the admission of Oregon in 1859, Kansas in 1861, West Virgnia in 1863, Nevada in 1864, Nebraska in 1867, Colorado in 1876, North and South Dakota. Montana, and Washington in 1889. Idaho and Wyoming in 1800 and Utah (making the forty-fifth State) in 1896. In the various State legislatures a similar practice prevails at stated intervals, generally of ten years intermediate with the Federal period, a reapportionment is made. This period is often taken advantage of by the party in the majority, who, by combinations of various kinds gerrymander the State, and so redistrict that their opponents are in a hopeless minority at the polls on many succeeding election days. AP'POSI'TION (I.at. appositio, a setting before, from ad, to + ponere, to place). A term in grammar signifying the annexing of one sub- stantive to another, in the same case or relation, in onler to explain or limit the first; as, my brother, the plnjsician; Thomas the Rhymer. Whole sentences or clauses admit of apposition, Thus: "Xapoleon sought the way to India through Russia, a stroke of genius." Sometimes a connecting word is used where logical propriety would require apposition; as, the city of London, for the city London.

APPRAISE'MENT (from Eccles. Lat. ap- prrtinre. to value at a price, to rate, from Lat. a(?, tn 4- prrfiinn. price). The official or formal valuation ot property, in accordance with legal requirements, or b}' agreement between the par- ties interested. Official appraisements in legal proceedings are regulated generally by statute, and are most frequently resorted to in the case of merchandise subject "to customs duty: of the personal estate of a decedent: of pro|)erty taken for public use under the right of eminent do- main, or damaged by authorized public works, such as canals: of wrecked property; of property of bankrupts or insolvents: and of property lev- led upon under judicial process, or distrained for rent. Unofficial appraisements are often pro- vided for by the agreement of parties interested, as in the case of insured property which is injured or destroyed. When an appraisement is duly made, in a legal proceeding or by mutual agreement, the value set upon the property is, as a rule, conclusive upon the parties interested therein.

APPREHEND' ( Lat. apprehender^ to seize). To talce a person into custody by war- rant of law for the purpose of subjecting him to criminal process. The apprehension of the per- son accused of crime is not, strictly speaking, a part of the criminal process, but may precede it, or may occur at any stage in its progress prior to conviction of the sentence imposed. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, it may be dispensed with altogether, where the sentence does not call for physical punishment of the offender, in England and the United States, however, the trial of a person accused of crime cannot proceed without apprehension or personal submission of the accused to the process of the court. The term arrest (q.v.), which is, in strictness, ap- plicable only to detention in civil cases, is now commonly employed in all cases of taking into custody. APPREHEN'SION (Lat. apprhenso, a setting upon, grasping, understanding, from ad, + prehendere, to seize). A term denoting the subjective aspect of perception and imagination, as presentation and representation denote their objective side. Two special uses of the word may be noticed. (1) The phrase "direct appre- hension" is employed for the habitual recog- tion of objects and persons whose presence in our surroundings is a matter of course. We do not. ictnels, -'recognize" the clothes that we put on every morning, the pen with which we write, the familiar faces of our household; there is no trace of associative supplementing, or of any well-marked mood of familiaritv. Rather, we apprehend them dircctly. Their look and touch set up a certain bodilV attitude, the atti- tude, of easy "at-homeness"; "and it is the vague, ill-defined mood of "at-homeness" which mediates the recognition (q.v.). (2) Stout has carried this reduction a step further, in his doctrine of "implicit apprehension." "It is possible," he says, "to distinguish and identify a whole with- out apprehending any of its constituent details." It is possible, e.g., to understand the meaning of a word — somethmg that stands for a highly com- plex combination — without any mental imagery whatsoever; the meaning is 'implicitly appre- hended by an imageless thought. There" is some- thing fascin.ating about this assumption of "a mode of presentational consciousness which is not composed of visual, auditory, tactual, and other experiences derived from and in some de- gree resembling in quality the sensations of the special senses," yet which possesses "a repre- sentative value or significance for thought"; but its assumption is unnecessary. By the law of exclusion (see Association of Ideas), the middle terms of a train of ideas may drop out, with frequent repetition: so that the idea x, which was at first mediated by abed, is now called up by a alone, without the intervention of bed. So the sound, or articulatory "feel," or sight of the word might come, in time, to carry the meaning which had originally been carried by associated images. Moreover, there can be no understanding, even of the most familiar word, without the arousal of the mood of "at home," with its constituent organic sensations; and there can be little doubt that these are the real vehicle of the word's meaning. Consult: G. F. Stout, Analytic Psychology (London, 1896); E.